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Summary 
The issue of native title compensation generates deep divisions and conflicting 
evaluations in Australia. Underlying the tensions are unresolved questions 
concerning the nature of the native title that might be affected; how loss, 
impairment and extinguishment are to be determined and measured; who is 
entitled to compensation and on what basis; what might constitute just terms for 
that compensation; and who is to pay it. To date, solutions have largely been 
dominated by legal and economic valuation discourse, often pursued within 
highly charged contexts of resource development or court litigation. This paper 
presents a largely anthropological and ethnographic analysis of these matters by 
examining some of the competing modes of discourse about compensation; 
namely, the Aboriginal, statutory, common law and policy discourses. 
The primary focus of the paper is on one particular mode of discourse which 
seems largely to have been missing from the public debate to date, but which is 
arguably central to it; namely, that of Aboriginal groups in respect to their own 
regimes of compensation derived under Aboriginal law and custom. For that 
purpose, the paper commences with an ethnographic analysis of Aboriginal 
compensation processes, concepts and criteria, and seeks to extrapolate the core 
compensatory principles and values that might be generally applicable. Many 
Aboriginal groups across the country continue to exercise varying compensatory 
rights, interests and responsibilities that are derived from Aboriginal law and 
custom, and are directly relevant to native title over land and waters.  
The paper then proceeds to describe the distinguishing features of the multiple 
statutory pathways established for compensation under the Native Title Act 
1993—for there remains considerable confusion about them. Aboriginal people 
bring the values, behaviours and logic grounded in their own culturally-based 
compensation processes with them when they engage in these statutory 
procedures. The Aboriginal discourse about compensation is not always 
compatible with Western legal principles or market valuation models. Nor is it 
always comprehensible to other parties involved in statutory negotiations or 
determinations of compensation. 
The paper then considers the value systems revealed in Aboriginal compensatory 
processes, and their implications for how ‘loss’, ‘extinguishment’ and ‘just terms’ 
might be better conceptualised by the common law and in practical negotiation 
settings. It is argued that a core attribute of native title is that it is ‘cultural 
property right’ and that land is an inalienable Aboriginal possession, the 
extinguishment of which would require full reinstatement. 
The paper then draws together these seemingly disparate threads to argue the 
need for a new ‘recognition space’ for ‘native title compensation’. It is proposed in 
the second half of the paper that native title compensation is, like native title 
itself, sui generis, or unique. Native title compensation will require an innovative 
jurisprudential approach that acknowledges it as a fundamentally new creature, 
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recognisable at the intersection of Aboriginal and Western laws. A precondition 
for that innovation will be the creation of a recognition space that ameliorates the 
legal ethnocentrism of the common law, and addresses the intrinsic value to 
Aboriginal people of their lands and waters. To assist in that objective, the paper 
proposes a ‘Heads of Damages’ for possible use in the more formal arena of 
arbitration and court determinations about compensation. The Heads is 
developed on the basis of the actual losses potentially experienced by individual, 
communal and future generation native title holders. Guidance as to the content 
of a Heads is taken from the Aboriginal compensation principles and criteria that 
are described in the first part of the paper. 
The paper concludes by highlighting the implications of these often 
incommensurable modes of discourse for practical negotiation and determination 
of native title compensation. A series of key policy challenges and long-standing 
lessons are discussed, including the issue of static compensation, substitution 
compensation, distributive equity and spread, the need for transparency and 
benchmarks, and proposed taxation arrangements for native title compensation. 
These policy and practical matters will all need to be addressed in order to secure 
just and sustainable compensation processes. 
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Introduction 
Writing about compensation for resource development in Papua New Guinea, 
anthropologist Colin Filer (1997: 156) reported that: 
Arguments about ‘compensation’ . . . are not merely the result of conflicting 
evaluations of things which have been lost, damaged or destroyed; they also seem to 
reflect a deeper division over the definition of ‘compensation’ itself, and hence the 
conceptual and emotional relationship between ‘compensation’ and the other forms 
of property or value which engage the minds of the participants. 
Similar deep divisions and conflicting evaluations engage the mind of parties in 
the Australian arena of native title compensation. Underlying the 
conceptualisation, negotiation and determination of native title compensation lie 
highly charged issues of cultural and legal ethnocentrism.  
In Australia, multiple statutory pathways to securing potential compensation 
have been established under the Native Title Act 1993 (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Act’ or ‘the legislation’). Some involve negotiation and mediation; others require 
arbitration and court determination. There are also different modes of discourse 
about native title compensation, using languages which often display an 
incommensurability of meaning and practice. Alongside the statutory, there are 
common law, policy, economic and Indigenous discourses, each operating 
according to its own logic, principles and criteria. When these discourses about 
compensation engage, competing views quickly arise about the specificity of such 
terms as ‘native title’, ‘impact’ and ‘effect’, and related matters of scale, duration 
and degree. A common feature, however, of these disparate discourses is that all 
are grappling with the concepts of property, value, extinguishment and loss; 
concepts which are increasingly subject to investigation by tribunals and 
hearings around the world (see Hann 1998; Jorgensen 1995; Kirsch 2001; 
National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) 1999; Posey 1990).  
With such highly charged matters at hand, this paper is a preliminary attempt to 
disentangle some of the threads of incommensurability. Two key modes of 
discourse about compensation—the Aboriginal and the statutory—are examined 
in some detail to draw out their key principles and concepts.1 This serves several 
purposes. The first is to clarify the distinguishing features of the multiple 
statutory pathways established for compensation under the Act—for there 
remains considerable confusion about them. The second is to consider the 
implications of the statutory and related common law procedures for securing 
practical and just outcomes. The third is to highlight some of the key policy 
challenges and long-standing lessons that will need to be addressed in order to 
secure such outcomes. 
The fourth and perhaps primary purpose is to more fully explicate one discourse 
about native title compensation that seems to have been largely missing from the 
public debate to date, but which is arguably central to it; namely, that of 
Aboriginal groups in respect to their own regimes of compensation sourced in 
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Aboriginal systems of law. For that purpose, the paper commences with an 
ethnographic analysis of Aboriginal compensation processes, principles and 
concepts, and of the related rights, interests and responsibilities in land that are 
embedded within these. The paper considers the value systems revealed therein, 
and their implications for how ‘loss’, ‘extinguishment’ and ‘just terms’ might be 
better conceptualised for the purposes of common law consideration and the 
negotiation of compensation. 
An overall objective is to draw together these seemingly disparate threads in order 
to construct a ‘recognition space’ for ‘native title compensation’. It is argued in the 
second half of the paper that native title compensation is, like native title itself, 
sui generis, or unique. Native title compensation will require an innovative 
jurisprudential approach that acknowledges it as a fundamentally new creature, 
recognisable at the intersection of Aboriginal and Western laws. Such an 
approach will entail the ‘construction of emergent principles’ and ‘new rules’ 
(French 2000: 3). A precondition for that innovation will be the creation of a 
recognition space that ameliorates the legal ethnocentrism of the common law, 
and addresses the intrinsic value to Aboriginal people of their lands and waters. 
Such an approach would need to be based on an exegesis of logically probative 
facts about the Aboriginal value of ‘cultural property’ (see below and Kirsch 2001), 
and about the related compensatory rights and interests exercised by Aboriginal 
people. To assist in that objective, the paper proposes a ‘Heads of Damages’ 
(Heads) for possible use in the more formal arena of arbitration and court 
determinations. 
The emerging discourses and divisions over compensation 
An important mode of discourse about native title compensation is carried out in 
statutory and common law terms. In the Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 
CLR 1 (hereafter Mabo No 2) decision, the High Court declared that the common 
law of Australia recognises and affords protection, under certain conditions, to 
the native title rights and interests of Indigenous Australians. The decision also 
stated that while there may be locations where native title has survived intact, 
there would be circumstances—past, present and future—in which native title 
could be impaired or extinguished. 
The Mabo No 2 decision and the subsequent Native Title Act 1993 enacted by the 
Federal Government established the legal principle that compensation may be 
payable to native title holders for specified actions (referred to as ‘acts’ in the 
legislation) which lead to ‘extinguishment’ or to any ‘loss, diminution, impairment 
or other effect . . . on their native title rights and interests’ (ss. 48, 51(1)). An act 
is said to ‘affect’ native title if it ‘extinguishes’ native rights and interests in lands 
or waters, or is ‘otherwise wholly or partly inconsistent with their continued 
existence, enjoyment or exercise’ (s. 227). The historical fiction of terra nullius was 
thereby replaced with the legal fiction of extinguishment. 
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What constitutes loss, diminution, impairment or extinguishment—and whether 
the latter may be partial or full—is not yet settled by the Australian courts and is 
subject to ongoing debate (Bartlett 2000; French 2000; Neate 1999). The statutory 
framework prescribes as an overriding measure that an entitlement to 
compensation is ‘an entitlement on just terms’ (ss. 51, 53). Compensation on ‘just 
terms’ seems a governing issue—the way in which ‘just terms’ is defined is at 
least as important as defining what ‘compensation’ might mean. 
In Australia, the debate about how to conceptualise and value native title 
compensation is linked to the fundamental question of what constitutes native 
title. Native title is broadly defined in the legislation to mean: 
• the ‘communal, group or individual rights and interests in relation to land or 
water’; 
• where those rights and interests are possessed under ‘traditional laws 
acknowledged, and traditional customs observed by’ Indigenous Australians;  
• where people, ‘by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land 
and waters’;  
• those ‘rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia’  
(s. 223(1)); and 
• it is specified that native title includes hunting, gathering and fishing rights 
and interests (s. 223(2)).  
The legislation has left many critical issues and concepts open for practical 
resolution. The specific details remain to be worked out between parties in 
negotiation or in the courts. With regard to compensation, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the following key issues.  
• What are the native title rights and interests that have been, or might be, 
affected by an ‘act’ of government or a third party? 
• What is the nature of the act’s impact on those native title rights and 
interests? 
• How is loss, impairment or extinguishment to be determined? 
• Who is entitled to compensation and on what basis?  
• Who pays compensation and on what basis?  
• How is the extent of compensation to be measured and its form determined?  
A range of opinions are expressed by stakeholders. To date, proposed solutions 
have largely been dominated by legal and land valuation discourse, often pursued 
within highly charged contexts of resource development or court litigation (see, in 
particular, Gardner 1998; Sheehan 1997, 1998). Not surprisingly, many parties 
are looking for the elusive Holy Grail of a formula or standardised procedure for 
the calculation of compensation. 
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However, a practical way forward is made difficult by a number of factors. 
Common law recognition of native title is in its infancy in Australia. Described as 
a ‘moveable feast’ (Edmunds & Smith 2000: 4; see also French 2000), it is 
developing case by case, not always in a consistent manner, and in 
circumstances where the traditional laws and customs from which native title is 
‘solely derived’, are ‘incompletely known’ and ‘imperfectly comprehended’ (Mabo 
No 2). 
Another challenge is the complexity of the statutory framework. Different 
potential types of statutory compensation have been created with multiple 
pathways by which they might be secured; and each pathway invokes distinctive 
processes, principles and criteria. Amendments to the legislation made in 1998 
also generate a greater degree of intersection between certain pathways, enabling 
more flexible combinations of processes to be activated, but also adding to the 
overall complexity. 
Furthermore, the term ‘compensation’ is used differently throughout the 
legislation, and nowhere is it defined. Also, it is used interchangeably with other 
terms such as ‘condition’, ‘consideration’, ‘payment’, and ‘trust amount’. In effect, 
native title compensation can be negotiated, mediated, arbitrated or determined 
via different statutory procedures which invoke differently defined categories of 
native title parties. In a number of instances compensation can be secured at the 
same time that other ‘conditions’ apply which, in turn, have a compensatory 
character. 
These complex permutations arise because the legislation not only establishes 
procedures for the common law recognition and protection of native title, but also 
for its legal extinguishment, forced taking, and loss. It also affords statutory 
entitlements which allow native title rights and interests to be traded by way of 
negotiated consent. The High Court has declared that the rights of negotiation are 
‘valuable rights’ which enable applicants to ‘protect’ their claims and may result 
in them ‘obtaining a commercially beneficial settlement’. The legislation thereby 
provides ‘claims of native title [with] an economic as well as a spiritual and 
physical dimension’ (McHugh at 253, 259 in North Ganalanja Aboriginal 
Corporation v Queensland (1996) 135 ALR 225). In a number of contexts, these 
tradeable statutory rights are being used as bargaining leverage to secure 
compensation, not only as a consequence of temporary impairment or 
diminution, but also as a straightforward means to revenue sharing. In many of 
these cases, extinguishment simply has not been an issue. 
To add to the statutory and common law complexity, there is an Indigenous 
discourse about compensation. Culturally-based criteria and values are held by 
Aboriginal people about the nature, purpose and means of determining of 
compensation. Many groups across the country continue to exercise 
compensatory rights, interests and responsibilities that are derived solely from 
Aboriginal law and custom and that are directly relevant to native title over land 
and waters. Like the Native Title Act 1993, Aboriginal regimes of compensation 
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have multiple pathways, principles and criteria, and outcomes that are subject to 
negotiation in the shadow of the law. 
Importantly, Aboriginal people bring the values, behaviours and logic grounded in 
their own culturally-based compensation processes with them into the native title 
negotiation and litigation arena. The Aboriginal discourse about compensation is 
not always compatible with Western legal principles or market valuation models. 
Nor is it always comprehensible to other parties or institutions involved in 
negotiating or determining compensation under the legislation.  
Inevitably, whichever statutory pathway is pursued, parties confront deeper 
divisions that unfold as they attempt to translate the different discourses of 
compensation. The languages of these discourses often display an incom-
mensurability of meaning. 
If ‘just’ and sustainable outcomes are to be secured, an innovative jurisprudential 
and policy approach is required that acknowledges native title compensation as a 
fundamentally new creature: the combined product of several modes of discourse 
that is recognisable at the intersection of Aboriginal and Western laws. Such an 
approach will entail the ‘construction of emergent principles’ and ‘new rules’ 
(French 2000: 3), and the development of enabling policy frameworks to facilitate 
agreement-making and settlements. 
Aboriginal regimes of compensation  
In this section a cross-section of ethnographic literature is reviewed and 
combined with the author’s field research experience in urban, rural and remote 
communities over a period of 27 years, in order to elucidate the general features 
of the compensation regimes operating within Aboriginal societies. The 
constituent principles, criteria, values and processes are drawn out, and their 
embeddedness within an overarching system of rights and interests in land and 
waters is described. The outcomes pursued by Aboriginal people from their own 
compensation processes are highlighted. 
This review is preliminary and is not an exhaustive coverage of the available 
literature. There are obvious gaps in time periods and locations; especially for 
areas of settled Australia where the historical and ethnographic record is often 
thin. It is not the intention here to promote a culturally static or reified account of 
Aboriginal compensation regimes; the social organisation and land tenure 
systems which underlie them are dynamic and so, therefore, are compensation 
processes and mechanisms. Furthermore, there is considerable diversity in the 
forms of social and economic organisation evident across the country, so that 
constituent rights, interests and responsibilities in land will vary between groups. 
Compensation processes and mechanisms similarly respond to these variations.  
Furthermore, as Sutton (1981) perceptively argued over a decade before the 
native title legislation existed, Aboriginal people in settled Australia continue to 
exercise a sense of Aboriginal identity—they retain the ‘bones of the culture; that 
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is, the principles of things such as socialisation of children, family life, their role 
as kin, modes of conversational interaction, systems of rights and responsibilities, 
and so on (see also his subsequent detailed ‘updating’ of that argument in Sutton 
1998b). I would further argue that they continue to retain and exercise, to varying 
degrees, forms of distinctly Aboriginal compensation processes, principles and 
criteria. Accordingly, as Sutton argued in 1981, Aboriginal groups in settled 
Australia can justifiably demand land rights and compensation for territorial 
dispossession. 
Like native title itself, the specificity of rights, interests and responsibilities 
exercised under Aboriginal compensation processes will vary on a case by case 
basis; but also, like native title, there are arguably core compensatory principles 
and values derived from the underlying system of Aboriginal law and land title 
which is common across the country. These core structural traits can usefully be 
extrapolated to a general level of applicability to Aboriginal groups. It is precisely 
because of that general applicability that parties in negotiation about any matter 
involving compensation with different Aboriginal groups across Australia, find 
themselves encountering the same modes of interaction, logic, expectation and 
discourse. The following analysis attempts to draw out the core traits of 
Aboriginal compensation processes. 
Aboriginal law: The grounds for compensation 
Aboriginal groups in many parts of the country continue to possess and exercise 
compensation rights, interests and responsibilities that are derived under their 
extant traditional laws and customs. 
Aboriginal law operates as a whole system underpinning personal property and 
communal title, and establishes what some refer to as the ‘right road’ for people 
to follow. It is not a bundle of accidental principles or isolated relations (Keen 
1994; Williams 1986, 1987). But neither does it resemble Western law in its 
structure, first principles or processes. It has its own notions of precedent and 
ancient moral authority, externalised into the Dreaming. As Myers notes (1986: 
49), the Dreaming and system of law derived from it ‘constitute the ground or 
foundation of the visible, present-day world’; it is a ‘theory of existence’ in which 
everything, including land, water, persons, customs, and resources originates.  
Concepts of personhood, group identity and human agency are inextricably linked 
to the law and to land.2 With its origin in a religiously framed creative epoch, the 
law constitutes a source of permanent cultural values for Aboriginal societies. It 
is the repository of law-given precedents and moral authority which is perceived 
as having no arbitrariness. It provides what Weiner (1992: 4) calls, ‘cosmological 
authentication’—that is, an authority lodged in the sacred and religious domains 
which transcends the mundane and impermanent aspects of social life, but which 
nevertheless dictates in daily affairs how material resources and social practices 
link individuals, groups and land. Conceived as such, ‘the law’ drives much of 
customary legal behaviour across different domains; for example, in areas of 
property rights and responsibilities, marriage and kinship, daily family life and 
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socialisation, economic production and exchange; ritual and ceremony, and so on 
(Keen 1994; Maddock 1984; Sutton 1988; Williams 1986, 1987). Dreaming-
derived law provides certain people, places and processes with a powerful 
legitimating force and value.  
The paradox (and achievement) of the Dreaming is that it facilitates personal 
creativity and individual autonomy within an ontological framework that 
disguises the process of change under a consciousness of permanence and the 
veneer of conservatism (see especially Morphy 1997; Myers 1986; Weiner 1992). 
On the one hand, individuals deny unilateral personal agency regarding the law, 
whose foundation and reproduction are externalised into the Dreaming. 
Nevertheless, within a spiritually sanctioned view of the law as unchanging, in 
everyday life there is a fluid ‘here and now’ quality in which behaviour and events 
are actively interpreted, negotiated and manipulated in the shadow of the law 
(Merlan 1998; Myers 1986). As a consequence, human assessments and decisions 
about circumstances that might require a compensatory response are not 
necessarily predictable. But when made, they will be framed by recourse to the 
law.  
As a theory of existence and value, the law provides the grounds for people 
thinking about and practicing compensation. The legitimacy and enactability of 
rights, interests and responsibilities that comprise Aboriginal compensation 
processes are constituted by laws that are part of a system of like laws which 
form an interrelated whole. Aboriginal law governing compensation is based on 
locally recognised codes of behaviour and shared values regarding what is termed 
‘wrong-way’ and ‘right-way’ behaviour. It is expressed in public processes for 
applying sanctions, punishment, redress and restitution. ‘Wrong-way’ behaviour 
is responded to and enforced by representatives of social authority, differently 
constituted according to their age, kin relatedness, ceremonial seniority, power, 
gender and so on. 
Aboriginal conceptualisations of compensation are therefore complex, and 
correlated to a fundamental relationship posited between the individual, group, 
land and the eternal law of the Dreaming. As a theory of existence and value that 
assists groups to actively assimilate and respond to change, and that legitimises 
change as continuity, the law affords a crucial adaptive mechanism for 
contemporary Aboriginal societies across the country. Processes of compensation 
derived from contemporary Aboriginal law and custom are extant amongst many 
Aboriginal groups who continue to negotiate their exercise of related rights, 
interests and responsibilities. In the following sections the nature of those 
processes, rights, interests and responsibilities are further explored. 
Events and behaviour provoking compensation processes 
Aboriginal compensation is about property—that is, property as defined in terms 
of what Hoebel (1966: 424) referred to as its essential nature; namely, the 
network of social relations that governs the conduct of people with respect to the 
use and disposition of things. As Gray (1994: 192–4, citing Justice Douglas’s 
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decision in the Sierra Club case) and Hann (1998) have well understood and 
clarified for different audiences, the most important ‘property’ in any resource is 
the right to participate in the selective exploitation or prioritisation ‘of its various 
forms of value’. To be recognised as having the right to ‘speak for’ an asset, to 
have a ‘dispositive voice’ in dictating the terms of its circulation, access, 
utilisation and distribution, is to command ‘an intensely significant component of 
“property” in the resource’ (Gray 1994: 193). The social conditions for 
compensation are first activated when the distribution of entitlements to access, 
use and distribution are called into question or put at risk. 
There are certain behaviours and incidents in the Aboriginal domain that may put 
such entitlements at risk and initiate the need for some form of compensatory 
assessment and action. A preliminary review of the ethnographic literature (see 
references) suggests such behaviours and incidents include those listed below. 
1. Actions against bodily property, including committing a personal injury and 
wounding (accidental or otherwise); committing murder and homicide; 
‘accidental’ death (in a world where individual agency is disguised, many 
deaths are perceived to involve religiously-based causation).  
2. Theft of objects (including land, ritual paraphernalia, designs), or of power 
(for example, in the form of knowledge), or of sexual rights (such as by 
adultery). 
3. The failure to resolve indebtedness or respond to reciprocal obligations and 
demands (whether they be economic, social or ritual), and the refusal to 
honour contractual obligations (such as for bestowal and marriage).  
4. Committing a transgression or offence against persons in authority, 
especially by younger to older senior people.  
5. Verbal trespass (for example, given that speaking for land is an act which 
confirms and asserts one’s rights of ownership of that land, then talking for 
country which is not one’s own, or publicly declaring restricted words, 
constitute important verbal trespasses upon the rights and interests of 
others).  
6. Economic trespass (including the taking of resources from another person’s 
country without permission or reciprocity). 
7. Various acts of religious trespass and sacrilege (including breaches of 
religious obligation and behaviour, breaches of taboo associated with sites 
and ceremony, breaches of restricted knowledge; grievances arising from 
sorcery; and failure to safeguard and manage spiritual resources). 
8. Physical trespass onto the geographic space of a dangerous and restricted 
location, or onto country that is not one’s own, for illicit purposes.  
9. Committing damage (including accidental or deliberate) to land and sites, to 
totemic flora or fauna, as well as the related failure by an individual or 
group to safeguard and protect land and its environmental resources. 
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This range of behaviours and events can all be characterised as constituting 
forms of trespass in its widest meaning. That is, they are perceived by Aboriginal 
people to be examples of unlawful acts which cause injury to, and improper 
inroads upon, other groups’ or individuals’ property, presence, authority, rights 
and resources. They may be deliberate or accidental, actual or implied, short or 
long-term in their duration. But as forms of trespass they will be interpreted as 
an intrusion, transgression or offence, and so deemed to require a compensatory 
response. 
Construing the effect of an action or event 
The nature of effect (its quality, scale, duration and so on) is directly related to 
the type of causative action or event involved. For each action or event such as 
those listed above that is construed negatively as trespass, the effect of 
transformation and loss confronts people. For example, an action may challenge 
the distribution of social relations or potentially sever them, infringe rights in the 
use and disposition of things, jeopardise principles of authority, or make 
vulnerable the legitimising force of the law and Dreaming. In other words, the 
extent of effect has many dimensions, and these are subject to interpretative 
construction by individuals and groups.  
The ethnographic literature makes it clear that Aboriginal landowners will 
investigate the nature and possibility of effect across a range of domains, 
including on: 
• the land and sea, and sites within them;  
• people’s possession, access, use and enjoyment of land and sea; 
• individuals, families, groups and their social relations; 
• an individual’s physical and psychological health and wellbeing;  
• the environment and its natural resources; 
• religious life and the law itself;  
• the systems of knowledge related to the above; and  
• on group authority over all the above. 
It can be generally argued that, within the Aboriginal worldview, effects are not 
easily quarantined. Rather they are seen to be contagious, easily spreading from 
one of the above domains to others, and they may have multiplier effects that 
potentially escalate conflict in the process (see e.g. Chase 1980: 283–5; Sutton 
1995: 42, 46, 57; Williams 1987). The logic used by people to interpret this 
contagion emphasises the effect of an action or event on both the visible and 
invisible worlds. An intimate interdependence is perceived to exist between these 
worlds; for example, conception, foetal nurturing, birth, the bodily wellbeing of 
humans, and their eventual death are all regarded as being spiritual as well as 
physiological processes and, above all, are causally linked to the spiritually 
embodied land (see Morphy 1997; Munn 1986; Smith 1981). Land not only 
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contains the bodies and spirits of past ancestors who have ‘gone down’ into it, but 
it also incubates the spiritual essences from which foetuses are created and 
babies ‘come up’ (Smith 1981). Its geographical features also represent the 
metamorphosed forms and imprints of the Dreaming creator beings. All these 
essences of spiritual signification are regarded as exercising an active agency in 
the real world—an agency which can directly affect individual physiological 
development and physical wellbeing. For example, a person may bear certain 
telltale birth marks on their body that were put there by a particular Dreaming; 
they may display physical mannerisms or personal idiosyncrasies from an 
ancestor associated with their spiritual conception; or evince an attachment to a 
particular story or totem because they were conceived or born at a related site 
(see Brady 1999: 166–7; Smith 1981: 181–8). It is not surprising then that the 
effect of actions may easily spread from the personal, to the social, to the land 
and law—and vice versa. 
An important and sometimes dangerous burden of interpretation is imposed upon 
key individuals and groups regarding the type of transformations created by an 
act, in and across these domains. Ongoing assessments will be made of the extent 
of effect in respect to its scale, duration, and the degree of social and religious 
repercussions. The gravity of the offence, the motivation and mental state of the 
perpetrator, the harm done to those people and things at the hub of effect, the 
prevalence of the action, and the need to uphold the law through deterrence, are 
all factors taken into account in the complex process of interpreting effect and 
thereby determining a compensatory response. 
Evaluations of the nature of the effect may be carried out publicly. Williams 
(1987: 49–66) describes the holding of clan ‘moots’ as a mechanism of dispute 
settlement amongst the Yolgnu (see also Berndt & Berndt 1952; Chase 1980; 
Elkin 1931: 191; Memmott 1979: 97–103). This involved intervention and 
management by persons with political authority, the gathering and checking of 
information, obtaining admissions of culpable acts, confirmation of action to be 
taken, and the application of sanctions. But when the effects of actions and 
incidents fall squarely within the realm of sacrilege and breach of religious taboo, 
consideration of similar issues will be restricted to closed group of religious 
authorities and dealt with summarily and without public declaration.  
A critical factor in evaluating the nature of an effect in order to determine the 
form compensation should take, is the need to identify the social boundaries of 
groups involved. 
Identifying the social boundaries of perpetration and impact 
As Weiner (1992) and Kirsch (2001) have noted, loss is a manifestation of the 
process of social relations. For Aboriginal groups, acts of trespass invariably 
require the interpretation and assignment of social interests and social 
responsibility. 
An act or event which provokes a compensatory process can most easily be 
construed as a central point of energy from which radiate a series of 
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repercussions; rather as a stone which, on falling into water, creates concentric 
waves whose energy is progressively depleted at the outer margins. In the same 
way, an act or event will produce a radiating social ‘field of perpetrators’ and a 
social ‘field of impact’ (see also Maddock 1972: 165, who refers to ‘fields of guilt’; 
and Sutton 1995: 42, who refers to the ‘politically responsible group’ making 
decisions and asserting rights and interests). The size and spread of the relevant 
social fields inevitably depends on the extent of transformation and loss created 
by the impact of the relevant action or event (see Sutton 1995: 42, 46) 
The ethnographic literature suggests that identification of these social fields will 
be based upon an interpretive reading of a mix of factors. The concept of 
‘distance’ has multiple connotations and appears to provide a broad framework 
within which possible factors are considered. There is a sociology and geography 
of ‘distance’ which can be ‘measured’ in terms of kin relations, and economic, 
ceremonial, political and ownership rights, interests and responsibilities 
(Maddock 1984; Myers 1986, 1989). 
Possessory and managerial distance 
Individuals and groups have multiple and overlapping ownership and 
management rights and responsibilities for particular tracts of land, water, sites, 
and totemic affiliations. Religious, political and economic interests in sites and 
estates are not exclusively held by their core or primary owners (see especially 
Sutton 1995). Even persons ostensibly belonging to the same corporate group 
have ‘different ancestries and life histories and, thus, only sometimes share 
identical “countries”’ (Sutton 1995: 33). These degrees of rights, interests and 
responsibilities will be measured on the basis of people’s possessory and 
managerial distance from the property (be that an object, place, relation or 
process) that has been affected, and will be taken into account by people at the 
hub of effect. 
In places where land ownership is intimately connected with Dreaming tracks and 
travelling ceremony, then the patterns of associated rights, interests and 
responsibilities are extremely complicated (see Sutton 1995: 54–7). Dreamings 
interpenetrate and connect people together. For example, different groups of 
people may own or have responsibility for managing the sites, songs or 
ceremonies associated with an extended Dreaming track crossing a number of 
their different ‘countries’. These groups may all be regarded (and regard 
themselves) as being directly affected by an impact that occurs at a particular site 
on one section of that track. For example, Peterson (1993: 77) reports that the 
beneficiaries of cash payments arising from a gold mining agreement included 
people who had important ceremonial links to the country on which the mine was 
located, but who themselves resided some 300 kilometres away from the mine 
site. Furthermore, as Sutton’s (1995, Ch. 1–8) analysis of Aboriginal boundaries 
and land ownership across the country indicates, Dreamings, powerful sites, 
ceremonies and stories are of different types and can engage different numbers  
of people. 
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The institutional relationship between Aboriginal ‘owners’ and ‘managers’ involves 
a relationship between senior persons that entails notions of compensation, in the 
sense that it is based upon mutual responsibilities to safeguard places and ritual 
processes, and a corresponding obligation to ‘pay’ when mismanagement occurs 
(Merlan 1982; Trigger 1989: 18–23). Accordingly, the specific persons undertaking 
the reciprocal set of ritually-based rights and duties to land, referred to in many 
areas as ‘owners’ and ‘managers’, may be included as members of the group 
affected by the damage to a natural object or site, or the breach of a religious 
obligation by either owners or managers. 
If an action or event is deemed to have significant transformative and multiplier 
effects, then the inclusion of people in both the fields of perpetration and of effect 
will likewise be expansive. Sutton (1995: 42) reports, for example, that if a 
decision is made about ‘allowing a major development that will transform a whole 
region, many groups may . . . be involved, even where the development site itself 
may be wholly on one small clan estate’. Josif (1988: 11, cited in Cooper 1992: 
232) noted that custodians of the Bula sites at Coronation Hill, which were 
subject to possible mining activity in the early 1990s, were anxious because 
‘Aboriginal people from other groups share spiritual ties with the Sickness 
Country . . . and may consider that Jawoyn were not performing their proper role 
as custodians’. Some Bula custodians feared ‘payback’ or sorcery if it was decided 
they had not protected sites properly. In Cape York Peninsula, people who own 
and perform the same ‘dance style’ for land that may be affected by an adverse 
act may be regarded as members of the social field of effect (Chase 1980). Dixon 
reported how the Aboriginal actors involved in the negotiation of the Glen Hill 
mining agreement in Western Australia conceived of the social extent of groups 
affected by the mine in terms of the traditional system of exchange, called winan. 
The winan connected distant groups with rights to participate under Aboriginal 
law, and functioned as criteria for including them in the social field of effect 
(Dixon 1990: 83–4). 
Genealogical distance  
All Aboriginal action and interpretation of events takes place within the ‘rubric of 
relatedness’ (Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993; Myers 1986: 117; Sutton 1998b). For 
the purposes of compensation, distance will also be measured according to 
degrees of social and kin relatedness. Persons may be excluded from the field of 
effect by being classified as ‘too far away’ in terms of their kin relation to the 
people at the hub of impact. Conversely, on the basis of the ‘logic of 
expansiveness’ initially applied by people (Myers 1986: 166), those persons who 
live far away from an act or event that has occurred, but who are ‘close kin’, will 
be regarded as experiencing the same effect as their family at the centre of the 
effect.  
By the same measure, genealogical ‘outsiders’ who reside with the group at the 
hub of effect might be vulnerable to inclusion in the field of perpetrators. They 
may choose or be required to make themselves geographically distant in order to 
avoid sanctions or punishment. The closer the genealogical relationship of people 
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identified as the perpetrators of an action, the more immediately fraught becomes 
the process of assessment, and the more urgent the need to clarify the extent of 
inclusion and to resolve the situation by way of compensatory settlement. 
Reading the intimacy and value of social relations is a difficult, potentially 
vexatious matter. Memmott (1979: 99) reports that an important part of ‘square-
up’ proceedings carried out after the death of a person was for the immediate 
family to ‘reassure’ certain others that they are not suspected in the person’s 
death. Chase (1980: 193) reports that every conflict situation encountered in his 
research in east Cape York meant that some people ‘were caught with divided 
loyalties’. These people were in fact referred to as kuuntyi yi’atyi (‘middle’ 
relations) and were expected not to take sides, but rather to attempt to prevent 
violence.  
Geographical distance 
Residential distance from the thing, country or person affected by an act or event 
combines with other factors to help determine the identity of groups involved. 
Geographic distance often has complex permutations. For example, residential 
closeness to the centre of impact of an act will tend to constitute a criteria for 
inclusion in the field of effect; unless it is counteracted by genealogical distance. 
As noted above, people who are regarded as genealogically or ceremonially ‘close’ 
to the people at the centre of an effect, but who nevertheless live a long 
geographical distance away, will tend to be included in the field of effect. For 
example, certain kunmokurrkurr groups in the Coopers Creek area of western 
Arnhem Land characterise themselves as being in a long-distance ‘company’ 
relationship which can link them in to shared consideration of compensation and 
the circulation of royalty payments (Kesteven & Smith 1983). 
There will also be a mundane geographic logic by which people can assert that 
other groups are simply ‘too far away’ to worry about their feelings or rights. The 
physical characteristics of the actual area subject to an effect may also mean that 
the geographical mapping of effects will be perceived to radiate out many 
kilometres in one compass direction, but be geographically restricted in another. 
For example, people with country located along the Coopers Creek in western 
Arnhem Land form a ‘riverine alliance’ referred to as ‘Marryalayala’ or ‘one creek’, 
so that the effects of some acts are considered to follow groups along the river, 
rather than travelling inland from it (Kesteven & Smith 1983: 123–5, 140). 
Distance as degrees of spiritual power 
Within the Aboriginal landscape, places, things and people vary radically in their 
importance. The relationship posited between people and ‘country’, and the law 
and Dreaming, imbues certain mundane things with a numinous character and 
relative degrees of ‘power’ or sacredness. There are particular people, places, 
objects, elements, behaviours and procedures which are regarded as directly 
expressing transcendent value and power. Some objects and sites accrete power 
and powerful memories over time, or by association with powerful substances (for 
example, particular trees which have birthing blood or umbilical cords buried by 
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them, mortuary sites for powerful persons, sites representing metamorphosed 
creator beings, sites where ceremony is conducted or important disputes have 
been resolved, etc). These visible signifiers of power are variously described in 
Aboriginal English as being ‘big’, ‘number one’, ‘boss’, ‘poison’, ‘sacred’ or ‘dear’. 
The consequences of an act on something ‘big’ may be seen as apocalyptic and 
can be transmitted through arterial flows of spiritual power to connect different 
groups (see Cooper 1992: 227). Some significant sites can be said to generate 
waves of repercussions that flow outwards to affect a much wider area of country 
and larger groups of people. For example, in one case, disturbances at related 
sites were stated as being sensed by Dreaming beings at the main site, and 
custodians were concerned about exploration activity up to ten kilometres from it 
(Merlan & Rumsey 1986 cited in Cooper 1992: 227). An effect which may appear 
insignificant in daily life may be interpreted differently in circumstances where 
powerful sites are involved. Arndt (1962: 304, 306) noted that in the close vicinity 
of one such site, sufficient disturbance may be as little as the careless kicking of 
a rock or stick, or the making of excessive noise (see also Cooper 1992). An effect 
on ‘big’ things radiates across land and people, invoking a much bigger social 
field of perpetration and effect, and requiring the imposition of heavier sanctions 
and recompense. Small local sites with less transcendental signification may 
invoke a more tightly defined set of kindred and field of effect. 
Temporal and personal dimensions of perpetration and effect 
The gender, age, and seniority of persons involved in committing an act, or 
experiencing its effects, are factors taken into account when people measure 
degrees of social inclusion or exclusion. Other factors are the sentimental forms 
of attachment by individuals to places and objects which act as memory maps of 
personal and group histories. 
Assessments of the social, physical and spiritual boundaries of effect and 
perpetration have to be carefully negotiated as they involve cross-cutting 
attachments, allegiances, politics and enforcement of the law. As Williams (1982: 
146) perceptively comments about processes of demarcating the physical limits of 
country: ‘reticence to locate precise boundaries may . . . [reflect] concern about 
the consequences of doing so, (and conversely)’. The same concern for 
consequences influences the assessment of social boundaries for the purposes of 
compensation. As a consequence, the process of evaluating social inclusion and 
exclusion will often continue in parallel with, and continue after, the actual 
process of settling compensation. 
The contagion and interpretation of current events is also replete with temporal 
force. Williams’ (1987: 65) statement that, for the Yolngu, ‘nothing ever really 
ends’ is applicable to most other Aboriginal societies. Old tensions and unsettled 
grievances from earlier incidents—some occurring generations ago—resonate 
through present-day social relations and are criteria for considering the 
motivation behind an action, and the extent of its effect. For example, Williams 
(1987: 67) reports on her inquiry into charges of sorcery, made after the death of 
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a senior man in 1969. One explanation was that it began in events occurring at 
least 30 years earlier, and ultimately involved a large number of people. Memmott 
(1979: 102) reports that before a proposed dance festival commenced at 
Doomadgee in late 1974, the several different groups attending spent the first day 
participating in ‘square-up settlements’ so that ‘old grievances could be settled 
and . . . not interfere with [its] success’.  
By implication then, while the effect of an action may in time recede or stagnate, 
if it is not appropriately resolved, it will be revived at a future date. The potential 
is that old grievances and their effects become construed by later generations as 
compounding or creating new grievances. In other words, the duration of an effect 
is not necessarily discrete, but may be scattered across time. 
In considering effect, custodians of land and close kin bear the burden of what 
Gray (1994: 195) refers to as the ‘principle of stewardship’: ‘Under this principle, 
ownership or possession of land is viewed as a trust, with attendant obligations to 
future generations as well as to the present’.3 The ethnographic literature 
indicates that Aboriginal stewardship entails ‘looking after’ country, people and 
the law in the present and for future generations, and transmitting the rights and 
responsibilities of stewardship to them (see Myers 1986; Smith 1981). Both 
individuals and groups may be held accountable to others for their stewardship. 
The concepts of ownership, stewardship and effect are underpinned by the notion 
of a ‘community obligation’ to preserve over time the collective entitlements to 
‘equitable property’ and ‘non-commodity values’ (Gray 1994: 202; see also Gray 
1991). From this perspective, if land is the property of Aboriginal people, then 
people are a property of the land.  
The forms of Aboriginal compensation 
Aboriginal compensation mechanisms reveal social values and preferences. For 
Aboriginal people, compensation is primarily about social process and prioritising 
certain relations, and can be enacted in a variety of ways. Invariably, people, the 
land and the Dreaming are placed at the hub of agency. The need for human 
action—in the form of sanctions, ‘pay back’, ‘squaring up’, recompense, 
retribution, or exchange—is framed as a necessary stabilising expression of the 
law. 
Compensation can consist of material recompense to the aggrieved person and 
group. For example, at ‘house opening’ ceremonies in Cape York conducted some 
time after a death to ‘open’ up the deceased’s dwelling and ‘free’ it from spiritual 
contagion, payments of food and household goods and other capital items are 
‘paid’ by the widow’s family to the family of the deceased husband (Martin 1993). 
Cash is a medium of social exchange, and payments of cash may be required by 
the aggrieved from persons identified in the field of guilt. For example, Peterson 
(1991: 75) noted the use of cash payments as a ‘compensatory mechanism’ in the 
case of a person paying a relative who had rights to their hair (for ceremonial 
purposes) when they had a haircut without that relative’s knowledge or 
permission. Access to valued resources may similarly have to be met by the 
16 SMITH 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
return of gifts to the owners (for example, as an equivalence, in the form of an 
artefact made from those resources (Myers 1986)). A person of eminence in the 
law who performs as a ‘witness’ to validate another’s claims to pre-eminent 
ownership rights and responsibilities for an area of land or a specific site, may 
subsequently demand and have to be paid cash as compensatory exchange for 
their testimonial comment. 
Aboriginal compensation also takes many non-material forms. For example, it 
may take the form of ‘an apology’ from people or from the government. It may 
consist of the conduct of ritualised ceremonies or highly orchestrated fights of 
reconciliation. These are widely reported across place and time, and include those 
described amongst the Pintubi by Myers (1986: 171); by Elkin (1931: 190–91) in 
the formal kopara exchanges held by the Lakes groups of South Australia; in East 
Cape York by Chase (1980: 192); in the Lardil ‘square-up fights’ described by 
Memmott (1979: 99–103); and in the peace-making ceremony (magarada) 
described in Arnhem Land by the Berndts (Berndt & Berndt 1952: 116). In 
instances of serious inter-group conflict over certain actions, settlement has been 
reported in the form of a series of exchanges of small areas of territory between 
particular groups. The transaction indicated a resolution of conflict, and involved 
not so much a transferral of ownership of land as a confirmation of continued 
access and shared rights to exploit resources (Kesteven & Smith 1983: 133). 
Compensation may be enacted through the application of sanctions and 
retaliatory punishment of the perpetrator(s). These mechanisms may be socially 
enacted (including suppression of social interaction, temporary ostracism or 
permanent expulsion from the group). They might be physical (including warfare, 
regulated civil revenge, and death). They might also be enacted through sorcery 
and the direct intervention of the spiritual domain. Once included within the field 
of perpetrators, the persons or their close relatives may be expected to allow 
themselves to be punished, either forcibly by means of spearing, or by offering 
their body to physically receive another’s injury punishment, or by physically 
replacing the thing itself (for example, a wife may be ‘given’ to another person in 
the deceased husband’s family). 
Individual autonomy has its bounds. People who repeatedly act against the social 
order eventually bring the action of their aggrieved kin upon themselves. In the 
past this may have resulted in them being put to death (Chase 1980: 190; Smith 
1981: 170–3). 
The law is said to be ‘hard’, and in certain circumstances the law will intervene of 
its own accord to punish breaches of religious taboo; for example, in the form of 
serious illness, death, sorcery or religious revenge. There are religiously-
empowered enforcers amongst people (and animals) who can instigate sorcery and 
mete out death. When offended, the spirits of deceased ancestors can punish 
relations by sending physical and environmental ills. For example, failure to 
observe requirements for ‘looking after’ and respecting the graves of close kin 
‘could bring punishment from the spirit to those who desecrated the physical 
remains’ (Chase 1980: 186). Through sorcery, certain people may also invoke the 
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particular qualities of a site to bring about physical and environmental calamity 
on others (for example, by ‘sending’ swarms of flies and mosquitoes, illness, rain 
and fire, and causing reproductive failure of people, plants and animals). It is the 
author’s experience that in many contemporary negotiation situations, Aboriginal 
people feel keenly that their decisions, if determined to be wrong by close kin or 
their own law, may result in their punishment by ill-fortune and ill-health. 
The form that compensation takes is directly linked to the nature of the provoking 
action or incident; to people’s reading of the type and extent of effects; and to the 
criteria of social distance involved. In summary, forms of compensation enacted 
may be: 
• action oriented and physical—in the form of punishment and sanctions 
involving regulated civil revenge, injury or death; 
• socially based—as in processes of ostracism, expulsion or self-imposed 
absence; 
• material and monetary—as in processes of exchange of cash, food, services 
or commodity goods; 
• religious and spiritual—via religiously empowered enforcers of punishment, 
the conduct of cleansing ritual, or through religious ostracism or expulsion; 
and/or 
• symbolic and performative—through apology or highly orchestrated 
reconciliation fights or planned confrontations. 
Aboriginal compensation as value system and process 
The Aboriginal semantic domain of compensation appears to be broader than that 
allowed for by Western economic and legally-based approaches. It is more akin  
to the Macquarie Dictionary definition of the verb ‘to compensate’, as: ‘to 
counterbalance variations; offset; recompense; to adjust or construct so as to 
produce equilibrium; to be an equivalent; to make amends’. The dictionary 
definition recognises the essential plasticity of the concept, and resonates with 
Aboriginal views where compensation is:  
• a process (the act of compensating and the state of being compensated);  
• a realm of valuation (for comparing and estimating the worth of a thing); 
• an entitlement and responsibility (the kind of compensation given or received 
as an equivalent for debt, loss, suffering, etc); and  
• an outcome (assessed by the extent to which recompense, equilibrium and 
amends have been secured).  
Perhaps the critical feature of Aboriginal compensation is that it is essentially a 
process-based system in which the relationship between people, the land, law and 
the Dreaming is paramount. The mechanism of compensation is used to affirm 
the value of that connection: to achieve defined social purposes; to reaffirm 
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relationships of mutual equivalence and demand sharing; to bind individuals into 
groups; and to confirm ownership of the land (see e.g. Chase 1980; Elkin 1931: 
191; Kickett 1999; Maddock 1984: 184; Martin 1995: 8; Memmott 1979: 97–103; 
Peterson 1991: 75, 1993). 
Compensation processes reveal realms of value with multiple referents. For 
example, in evaluating an effect for compensatory purposes, people closely 
consider: 
• the utility value of the thing and relationships involved;  
• the extrinsic value as a means to something desirable;  
• the inherent social value;  
• the moral and authoritative value derived under law;  
• its economic value, and so on.  
People strategically canvass these aspects of a thing or relationship’s ‘total value’, 
in order to come to some accepted understanding of the extent to which it is seen 
to have value, and the form of compensation that will correspond to that value. 
Underlying all forms of compensatory response is a notion of equivalence, the 
value of which has many dimensions. At its heart is the desire to restore sociality 
and reaffirm relationships of authority and the illusion of cultural permanence. 
The measure of that balance is in the form of what has been referred to as 
‘egalitarian mutuality’ (Maddock 1984: 184) or ‘assertive equalitarianism’ (Martin 
1995: 8). That is, the outcome should restore the expectation and satisfaction of 
reciprocity and ‘demand sharing’ (Peterson 1993), and acquit individuals and 
groups of indebtedness entailed by their inclusion in the field of perpetrators. 
Another measure of balance is expressed in the desire to secure a ‘levelling up’ or 
‘squaring up’ (pers. comm. P. Memmott and P. Sutton) based on a core principle 
of ‘equivalent injury’ (Stanner 1953). To secure that end, the principle of 
proportionality is applied. However, the outcome sought is not measured as an 
exact equivalence (in the sense of reducing one thing to another), but in the sense 
that the form of compensation must be judged as proportional to the loss or 
damage sustained, and capable of enabling a reinstatement of perceived total 
value. But restoring sociality and mutual responsibilities is not necessarily about 
equity. As noted above, some things and people are more ‘equal’ than others, 
more powerful, more senior. Accordingly, the balance sought through 
compensation may be asymmetrical and hierarchical in nature (such as in 
restoring the relationship of authority between senior and junior generations). 
People will make subjective judgments as to when the equal ‘total value’ of an 
effect has been obtained. 
Broadly then, a compensation process may be used to: 
• restore and maintain environmental productivity and reproductive capacity;  
• safeguard the health and reproduction of people and the land;  
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• re-establish economic exchange relationships; 
• restore and safeguard religious rights, interests and responsibilities; and/or 
• confirm the authority of groups and individuals for areas of land and water. 
The preferred primary outcome of all forms of compensation is to secure the 
semblance of finality in social and temporal domains, by acquitting individuals 
and groups of any perceived indebtedness and guilt entailed by their inclusion in 
the field of perpetrators.  
Inalienable possessions: valuing the invaluable 
Just as compensation reveals value, so too competition over the products of 
compensation reveals that which has been lost, most lost, and its value.4 The 
discussion of Aboriginal regimes of compensation so far has indicated that some 
things are more highly valued than others. This section reviews some 
ethnographic sources to consider what those things might be, and how that 
higher value might be construed. 
Drawing upon Myer’s erudite ethnography of Pintubi sentiment, place and 
politics, Weiner (1992: 101) notes that the Dreaming-derived law encompasses 
‘vast inalienable possessions that are authenticated by the very cosmology under 
which they are produced’. In an important analysis of the nature of exchange and 
social reproduction, Weiner examines the creation and core meaning of what she 
calls ‘inalienable possessions’—those things (be they land, sites, names, body 
designs, songs, stories, knowledge, ritual practices or paraphernalia) which 
become imbued with the intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners, accreted 
with history and memories, repositories of genealogies, and are transferred by 
their owners from one generation to another.  
As Weiner (1992: 42) notes, what gives inalienable possessions their power and 
potency is their authentication by an authority perceived to be outside the 
present. As a consequence, they act as the stabilising force against loss and 
impairment, and are critical to the reproduction of group identity and social 
relations through time. To that extent they are seen as timeless, outlasting their 
owners who must nevertheless bear the responsibility for recreating their social 
value over time. Such possessions bestow responsibilities of stewardship, out of 
which evolve many different levels of authority and relationship. Control over 
their meanings and transmission from one generation to the next are thus strictly 
circumscribed, and accords authority and legitimacy to successive owners.  
Inalienable Aboriginal possessions are dense with signification, whereby their 
value is seen to lie in their very inalienability. They have infinite utility and 
absolute value. They are said by the Anangu to ‘come in front’. Such value is 
translated in Aboriginal English as ‘big’, ‘dear’, ‘precious’. For Aboriginal groups, 
land is cum grano salis—the incomparable inalienable possession. It is a ‘value 
carrier’; that is, it is ‘value as such, the immovable ground above and beyond 
which real economic activity [is] carried out’ (Weiner 1992: 33). Such possessions 
become invaluable precisely because they are beyond commodification. 
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As Gray (1994: 161) notes, it is inevitable that all ‘property’ referents have about 
them an ‘utterly interdependent quality’. This is precisely the case with respect to 
Aboriginal conceptualisations of land. For example, not only does an individual 
trace kin relations to other individuals and groups, but to tracts of country and 
religious paraphernalia which may, in turn, be related to each other as kin (Keen 
1994: 110–24). Aboriginal land is an extension of the person and the group—
rights in rem and in personam are at the same level and centred within a spiritual 
framework (Sutton 1998a). It constitutes what Radin (1982) has called ‘property 
for personhood’. In other words, it is an object that is part of the way we 
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world; an analogy very 
close to Weiner’s notion of inalienable possession.  
In presenting an argument for the repatriation of the Elgin Marbles, Moustakas 
(1989: 1185) extends Radin’s concept in order to include group rights in cultural 
property—what he calls ‘property for grouphood’—which ‘expresses something 
about the entire group’s relationship to certain property . . . [and is] essential to 
the preservation of group identity and group self-esteem’.  
Writers including Kirsch (2001), Coombe (1993), Janke (1997) and Pask (1993) 
have more recently adapted these ideas to propose the centrality of ‘cultural 
property’ as a term encompassing both the loss of property as ownership of an 
object, and loss of property conceived as a sense of belonging or way of knowing. 
For Aboriginal Australians, land and its various manifestations in song, dance, 
knowledge, sites, ritual, names and so on, is more than ‘thin air’ (Gray 1991); it is 
cultural property for personhood and grouphood.  
Such inalienable possessions of personhood and grouphood can not be easily 
substituted; they are not fungible. Their value will not be not realised in free 
market exchange. Rather they accumulate a subjective and cosmological value 
which sets them beyond a reinstatement value. Such valuation defies the 
philosophy of possessive individualism and market exchange that defines Western 
legal categories of property (see Coombe 1993, drawing on MacPherson 1962). 
How then is the loss or impairment of such a possession construed and valued by 
its owners?  
When the locus of an inalienable possession’s authenticity is interfered with, then 
its absolute value declines, sometimes rapidly (Weiner 1992: 102–3). But more 
fundamentally, ‘taking a possession that so completely represents a group’s social 
identity as well as an individual owner’s identity and giving it to someone outside 
the group is a powerful transfer of one’s own and one’s group’s very substance’ 
(Weiner 1992: 104). The loss of inalienable possessions diminishes the person 
and by extension, the group to which the person belongs. 
Coombe (1993: 279) argues in the Canadian context, that the ‘commodification of 
Indian spirituality is understood to pose the threat of cultural dissolution’. 
Moustakas (1989: 1185) takes the implications of ‘property for grouphood’ to its 
logical conclusion. He suggests that such property should not be alienated 
‘because future generations are unable to consent to transactions that threaten 
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their existence as a group, and that commodification and fungibility are 
inappropriate ways to treat constitutive elements of grouphood’. 
From a legal perspective Radin (1982: 1014–5) argues that, where property is ‘for 
personhood’, there is a prima facie case that it is a property right that should be 
protected against invasion by government and against cancellation by conflicting 
fungible property claims. This case is strongest, she concludes, where ‘the 
claimant’s opportunities to become fully developed persons … would be destroyed 
or significantly lessened, and . . . where the personal property rights are claimed 
by individuals who are maintaining and expressing their group identity’. Such a 
case is routinely voiced by Aboriginal people in respect to their invaluable 
property for personhood and grouphood. The following sections examine the 
extent to which native title rights and interests in land and water—as clear 
examples of inalienable possession—are afforded protection against invasion by 
government and cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims; and how 
their extinguishment and loss might be, if they should be, valued for the purposes 
of native title compensation. 
The discourse about compensation under the Native 
Title Act 1993 
In this section we move from the Aboriginal discourse about compensation to the 
statutory discourse about native title compensation enacted in the Native Title Act 
1993. At this point I want to avoid becoming bogged down in the technicalities of 
the Act. Particular aspects of the statutory regime for compensation have been 
covered elsewhere in more detail (see Bartlett 2000; Edmunds & Smith 2000; 
Lane 2001; Litchfield 1999; NNTT 1999; Neate 1999; Smith 1998; Sumner 2000). 
Rather, the purpose here is to describe the multiple pathways established for 
potentially securing compensation, and to provide an overview of their key 
principles and criteria.  
An overview of native title compensation 
Broadly, the legislation sets out the range of ‘acts’ by government and third 
parties which may affect or extinguish native title. These categories include (Div 5 
ss. 48–54):  
• certain ‘past acts’ (which were invalid but made valid by the NTA) and took 
place before the commencement of the legislation on 1 January 1994; 
• certain ‘intermediate period act’ (taking place between 1 January 1994 and 
23 December 1996 which is the date of the High Court decisions in Wik 
Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1); 
• certain ‘future acts’ (which are defined as happening after those dates); and 
• when the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 has the effect that compensation is 
payable for an effect on native title by a valid past act. 
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The legislation sets a number of statutory qualifications on the entitlement to 
compensation, and refers to broad principles of assessment to be followed. These 
are outlined below.  
1. Compensation may variously be payable to registered native title claimants; 
native title holders, and/or their prescribed bodies corporate; persons 
claiming to be entitled to it;5 persons in the ‘native title group’;6 and possibly 
to other Indigenous holders of statutory rights and interests over land 
which have compulsorily converted or replaced native title rights and 
interests.7 
2.  It is liable to be paid by governments for acts attributable to them unless 
they have specified otherwise in relevant legislation, and may be payable 
under negotiated agreements by any third party liable, or agreeable, to pay. 
3. It can be paid only once in respect to acts that are essentially the same (s. 
49). 
4. In respect to acts affecting native title, compensation consists of money 
unless the person claiming to be entitled to the compensation requests 
otherwise, whereupon the court, person or body must consider the request 
and may make a non-monetary transfer which will constitute full 
compensation for the act (ss. 51(5–8)). 
5. In respect to an application for determination of native title, compensation 
may be requested in a non-monetary form, and such requests must be 
considered by the other negotiating parties, who must negotiate the 
proposal in good faith (s. 79(1)). 
6. In a non-monetary form, compensation may consist (without limiting other 
forms) of the transfer of land or other property or the provision of goods or 
services (s. 79(2)); the grant of a freehold estate in any land, or any other 
interests in relation to land whether statutory or otherwise (ss. 24BE(2), 
24CE(2), 24DF(2)); 
7. It is subject to the overriding constitutional condition that it be on ‘just 
terms’ (though its content and application to non-compulsory acquisitions 
remains to be sorted out by the courts). 
8. If based on a non-compulsory acquisition of native title rights and interests 
(for example, a mining tenement to which the non-extinguishment principle 
currently applies), then compensation may be determined by applying 
principles or criteria set out in relevant legislation under which the 
acquisition took place (referred to as the ‘similar compensable interests 
test’). 
9. If particular provisions of the legislation do not meet ‘just terms’ 
compensation, the legislation provides that additional compensation is 
payable to ensure the ‘acquisition is made on paragraph 51(xxxi) just 
terms’;8 and 
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10. compensation is not payable for the extinguishment of native title during 
the period before the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.9 
The multiple statutory pathways for native title compensation 
There are five broad pathways under the Act via which native title compensation 
may be secured (see Fig. 1). These are: 
1. an application for the determination of compensation, which may be either 
mediated or subject to litigation in the courts; 
2. an application for the determination of native title, which may be either 
mediated or subject to litigation in the courts; 
3. the negotiation phase of the right to negotiate where ‘agreed compensation’ 
may be secured;  
4. the arbitration phase of the right to negotiate where an arbitrated ‘trust 
amount’ may be determined on account of any future liability; and 
4. under Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) in the form of negotiated 
‘compensation’. 
Fig. 1. Statutory pathways to compensation 
 
Under the last four pathways, compensation may be secured without a formal 
application for the determination of compensation ever being made. The third and 
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fifth pathways may lead to forms of compensation being secured without native 
title having been finally determined. And the first process—the formal claim for 
compensation—may be commenced without an application for the determination 
of native title having been made, but can only be secured with such a 
determination being carried out in parallel by the court. These different pathways 
for compensation call forth differently defined native title groups, invoke different 
principles and criteria, and may deliver compensation in different forms. The 
extent to which the specific rights and interests comprising native title must be 
regarded or proven also varies significantly from one pathway to another. 
Importantly, the term ‘compensation’ is used throughout the legislation, but in 
different senses, and nowhere is it defined. It is also used interchangeably with 
other terms such as ‘condition’, ‘consideration’, ‘payment’ and ‘trust amount’—all 
of which have compensatory characteristics.  
Applications for determination of native title compensation 
When native title compensation is publicly discussed, the initial focus tends to 
fall on the formal claim applications made for the determination of compensation. 
However lodging such an application is only one of several pathways which 
parties may follow to consider compensation under the Act. To date, native title 
holders have been reluctant to make applications for determination of 
compensation and thereby acknowledge the possibility of extinguishment of 
native title (whether that be legal or cultural; see French 2000). Rather they have 
more energetically pursued lodging applications to secure a positive deter-
mination of their rights and interests as native title holders, and have been 
pursuing compensation by means of the other statutory pathways. 
As at early 2001, some 32 applications for the determination of compensation 
have been made of which 22 are active. No determinations have been made, 
although a number have directions hearings set for the second half of 2001. In 
practice, the mediation of compensation applications referred to the NNTT by the 
Federal Court is proving to be extremely complex. For example, there are no 
statutory conditions laid down for calculating the actual amount of 
compensation; the extent of native title rights and interests and the identity of 
native title holders involved has to be identified case by case; and the nature and 
extent of any effect of an act upon native title, and the specific area of land or 
waters so affected has to be agreed upon. Unresolved questions of fact, and the 
early phase of common law development in respect to native title, mean that 
parties have been quick to seek a referral of compensation applications out of 
mediation and back to the court.  
Applications for determination of native title 
While applications for the determination of native title are not about 
compensation, as a matter of practice it appears that their mediated terms and 
conditions may include payments and conditions of a compensatory type. These 
may consist of monetary payments or the provision of in-kind benefits to the 
native title parties, including the transfer of land and the provision of services and 
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goods. These benefits can be negotiated without a formal application for 
compensation ever having been made. They may comprise part of the final 
mediated agreement forming the basis for the court’s consent determination, or 
be obtained via side agreements that have been arrived at during the course of a 
claim mediation (in the latter case, before native title is determined) (See Fig. 1). 
There have been 23 such determinations of native title of which 13 are consent 
determination since 1993, some of which may include conditions that have a 
compensatory purpose in their deeds of agreement. One of these, the Dhungutti 
native title determination, included the first major compensation payment made 
under the auspices of a native title determination, and not as a result of an 
application for compensation.10  
The NNTT has additionally listed well over 500 ‘side’ or ‘ancillary’ agreements 
which have been arrived at between parties in the course of mediation. Such ‘side’ 
agreements are essentially private and do not have to be registered. According to 
anecdotal evidence some contain compensatory conditions. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to make any evaluation of the level or nature of compensatory conditions 
that might have been included to date in native title consent determinations of 
these ‘side’ agreements. Information about these determinations are held on the 
National Native Title Register as specified in s. 193(2), which at this stage it only 
includes the mandatory information elements identified in the legislation. 
Compensatory conditions, if they exist, are generally contained in the auxiliary 
Deed of Agreement that forms the mediated basis upon which a consent 
determination is brought before the court. These deeds are usually presented to 
the court as exhibits during proceedings and it is standard court practice to hand 
exhibits back to parties once a judgement has been made.11 
The right to negotiate 
The right to negotiate procedure established under the future acts regime of the 
legislation provides an important statutory framework for native title 
compensation. The greatest volume of activity concerning compensation occurs in 
this arena. Under the right to negotiate, the consideration of compensation takes 
on a substantially different character than under mediation of applications for 
determination of compensation or of native title. The statutory principles and 
criteria are also different within the process itself, depending upon whether 
parties are engaged in the negotiation or arbitration phase.12  
There are two broad types of compensatory payment to native title parties that 
might be secured under the right to negotiate. 
• Firstly, the native title party’s potential entitlement to ‘payments’ may be 
reckoned during the negotiation phase ‘as a result of doing anything in 
relation to the land and waters concerned after the act is done’ and parties 
must negotiate in good faith on the ‘effect of the act on the registered native 
title rights and interests’ (ss. 31(2), 33(1)). This first type of compensation 
consists of what might be called ‘agreed compensation’ secured during the 
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negotiation phase. Importantly, it may be secured before native title has been 
determined. 
• Secondly, an eventual entitlement by native title holders to payments is 
initiated during the arbitration phase as part of ‘conditions’ about the doing 
of the act, set out in an arbitral determination that must take into account 
the ‘effect of the act’ on various specified native title rights and interests (ss. 
36C(5), 38(1)(c), 39(1)(a) & (b), 52). This second type consists of a ‘trust 
amount’ determined under the arbitration phase on account of a future 
liability for compensation, which can only be paid after native title has been 
determined.  
In addition to the above, a negotiated agreement or arbitral determination arrived 
at under the right to negotiate may be made subject to any other conditions to be 
complied with by any of the parties (ss. 31(1)(b)(ii), 38(1)(c)). In some cases, such 
conditions may also have a compensatory element.  
It is difficult to analyse in any great detail the form and fairness of compensation 
being agreed to under the right to negotiate. As at February 2001, some 2,343 
future act agreements have been made over mining acts and 57 over non-mining 
acts (1,128 of these have been expedited procedure agreements). Compensation is 
mentioned in 22 of those agreements, although the nature of the compensation or 
other details are not known to the Tribunal. Section 34 agreements are lodged 
with the NNTT. However in Western Australia where the majority of agreements 
have been made, the State Government uses a pro-forma agreement which 
generally does not include any details of the compensatory or commercial terms. 
If there is an auxiliary agreement which does outline agreed terms and 
conditions, the Tribunal does not generally obtain such information. In other 
words, there are likely to be considerably more than 22 future act agreements 
containing compensatory conditions. 
To date, there have been no determinations by the NNTT of a trust amount as a 
condition of arbitration; although there has been considerable discussion of the 
criteria and principles which might apply in various future act arbitrations (see 
Sumner 2000). 
Indigenous Land Use Agreements 
The ILUA provisions are also tailored to provide an alternative pathway for parties 
to secure agreement over: 
• the doing of future acts—either singly or in classes—including the possible 
surrender by the native title party of its statutory right to negotiate;  
• dealing with future acts already done (including validating them), but not 
intermediate period acts;  
• changing the effect on native title of a validated intermediate period act;  
• dealing with compensation for past, intermediate period, or future acts; 
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• the relationship between native title and other rights and interests in relation 
to an area; 
• the way in which native title and other rights and interests in relation to the 
area will be exercised; 
• the extinguishment of native title by surrender to government; and 
• any other matters concerning native title in relation to the area under 
negotiation.  
Under the ILUA pathway, a form of negotiated compensation might be secured 
that is subject to different criteria than would have applied had it been negotiated 
under an application for compensation, or as ‘agreed compensation’ under the 
right to negotiate (see Edmunds & Smith 2000). Furthermore, the three types of 
ILUA—namely, Body Corporate Agreement, Area Agreement, and Alternative 
Procedure Agreement—have key differences.13 These include the identity of 
mandatory parties, the subject matter of the agreements; and the procedures for 
registering them (see Lane 2001; Smith 1998). These differences mean that the 
ILUA procedure represents a distinctive pathway for compensation. 
The ILUA provisions use a mix of terms including ‘compensation’, ‘consideration’ 
and ‘condition’. While compensation may be one of the conditions or 
considerations contained within such an agreement, ‘conditions’ and 
‘considerations’ are not the same as ‘compensation’, which has a specific 
statutory reference under the ILUA framework; namely, negotiated compensation 
for ‘any past, intermediate period or future act’ (ss. 24BB(ea), 24CB(ea), 
24DB(ea)). Unless the act consented to in the agreement is the surrender of native 
title, the non-extinguishment principle applies. 
An advantage of the ILUA provisions is that, in a context where native title is 
unresolved and parties do not wish to give away legal rights of currently 
uncertain status—such as whether native title exists, or whether it is 
permanently or temporarily extinguished or impaired by certain statutory acts—
they can nevertheless agree upon other more immediately actionable matters. An 
ILUA does not require that native title be bartered or exchanged for other benefits. 
Rather, an agreement could expressly state that it does not intend to permanently 
or partially impair or extinguish native title. It could also expressly recognise the 
existence of native title as a means of securing a party withdrawal and consent to 
the terms of any eventual determination. Extinguishment by surrender of native 
title, or surrender of the right to negotiate, can only occur when an agreed 
statement to that effect by the parties is included with an application for its 
registration. 
Ten ILUAs have been registered with the NNTT. According to anecdote, a number 
contain compensatory conditions, though once again, the full terms and 
conditions are generally not available for scrutiny. 
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The distinctive features of the statutory pathways 
While native title compensation may be determined through court litigation, it can 
also be mediated, negotiated and arbitrated—and using different principles and 
criteria. Amendments made to the legislation in 1998 have also facilitated greater 
intersection between certain pathways, enabling different criteria and principles 
to be activated. Additional complex practices have arisen because the legislation 
does not only allow native title to be impaired, surrendered or extinguished, and 
compensated for those adverse effects. It also establishes, as McHugh noted 
(North Ganalanja (1996) 135 CLR 225) native title as a valuable right with an 
economic as well as spiritual and physical dimension. As a consequence, it can be 
used as leverage and traded during the course of negotiations by native title 
parties as a ‘right of consent’ (Humphrey 1999: 132; Smith 1996: 11), and may 
lead to them ‘obtaining a commercially beneficial settlement’ (McHugh, North 
Ganalanja (1996) 135 CLR 225). 
These different pathways for compensation call forth differently defined native 
title parties. Under certain statutory procedures, the native title party that might 
secure compensation is restricted to the class of registered native title claimants 
and holders (for example, under the right to negotiate). In others, the native title 
party does not have to have passed the registration test in order to participate in 
mediation about issues including compensation; for example, under applications 
for the determination of native title or compensation. In contexts such as ILUAs, 
the parties securing compensation may include claimants who have not passed 
the registration test, persons who assert a common law native title right but do 
not have a claim lodged, and any other Indigenous persons. Under other 
pathways, the category of native title recipients of compensation may change from 
one phase of the procedure to another; for example, between the negotiation and 
arbitration phases of the right to negotiate.  
Under pathways such as mediation and negotiation where ‘side’ agreements can 
be made, native title claimants might secure compensatory payments or 
conditions before any final mediated outcome has been agreed. Under the right to 
negotiate or ILUA pathways, negotiated compensation might be secured by native 
title claimants immediately upon registration of the agreement and according to 
its terms, and occasionally, even before that stage. Pathways such as arbitration 
and compensation applications require native title to be proven before receipt of 
compensation can occur by native title holders.  
Not surprisingly, the extent to which the specific rights and interests comprising 
native title must be regarded or proven differs significantly from one pathway to 
another. For example, in order for an application for the determination of 
compensation to be made, there must also be a concurrent determination of 
native title including the relevant matters laid out in s. 86A. On the other hand, 
under the right to negotiate, while the native title party must have passed the 
threshold registration test, there is no requirement for native title to be 
determined nor any onus of proof on the native title party in that regard. Rather, 
the procedure is expressly built on the requirement that the parties and arbitral 
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body must assume the existence of the native title rights and interests entered on 
the Register of Native Title Claims. The NNTT in arbitration has argued, however, 
that the question of ‘effect’ is a matter of fact to be determined on the evidence in 
each case, and that there needs to be sufficient evidence to demonstrate which 
rights and interests will be affected and how (Sumner 2000: 86).  
Under the ILUA compensation pathway, the native title party may include 
registered, unregistered and common law claimants, and there is no onus of proof 
or requirement for an evidentiary demonstration or determination either of native 
title, or of the particular rights and interests that might be affected. Neither is 
there any statutory requirement for investigation of what effect an act might have 
on the native title. These are matters within the consideration of the parties and, 
to the extent that the agreement is able to pass its registration process, may be 
treated as prima facie, or with consensual disregard. 
The different statutory pathways chosen by parties may lead to compensation 
taking different forms. Even in contexts where the legislation specifies 
compensation must be in a monetary form, native title parties are also afforded a 
right to request it in any other form. As a matter of practice then, compensation 
under the various pathways of the legislation is comprised of a great range of 
forms (see case study examples discussed in Bridge 1998; NNTT 1999; Ritter 
1998, 1999). These include:  
• ‘consent’ cash payments;  
• access, use and rental payments and conditions;  
• negotiated profit sharing and joint venture arrangements;  
• an arbitrated bond or trust amount;  
• commercial and economically beneficial considerations;  
• land;  
• a wide range of in-kind commodities and services; and  
• protective and symbolic conditions.  
From a broad perspective, these can all be regarded as different aspects of the 
legislation’s overall compensation regime, ranging across a practical continuum 
related to mitigation, restoration, reparation, recompense, agreement and benefit. 
Different forms of compensation may combine under certain statutory 
circumstances, so that a total agreement package often has multiple 
compensatory characteristics. For example, a compensation payment that may 
initially have been based on a more tightly defined ‘adverse impact’ approach, 
may end up also containing payment conditions that are ‘consent related’ or 
directed to beneficial socioeconomic development outcomes.  
Consideration of native title compensation can occur in parallel, or intersect with, 
a number of discrete statutory procedures. For example: 
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• applications for the determination of compensation and for determination of 
native title may operate separately or intersect during mediation of shared 
issues; 
• in the course of mediation, either type of application may be diverted into a 
partial or non-native title agreement under s. 86F, or withdrawn and 
diverted into an ILUA process (ss. 86A, 86B); 
• compensation may be separately negotiated or arbitrated under the right to 
negotiate or under an ILUA without any other application being made for a 
determination of compensation; 
• negotiation and arbitration of conditions that might include compensation 
may overlap under the right to negotiate; 
• the right to negotiate may, in turn, be surrendered and proceeded with via 
an ILUA, where compensation for an act may also be agreed upon; and 
• litigation of a compensation application may be adjourned by the court to 
enable further mediation of issues including compensation to be carried out.  
Before choosing one pathway over another, parties need to consider carefully the 
impact that the different statutory principles and criteria applicable to each 
pathway will have on the conduct and outcomes of negotiations. Litigated 
compensation poses the problem of an externally imposed valuation of native 
title. The outcomes are unlikely to please any party. Negotiated compensation is 
consensually arrived at. It is processual rather than mechanistic in its methods; 
it affords native title parties the possibility of having their own compensatory 
preferences and criteria taken into account; and the terms of agreement are likely 
to be more sustainable into the future. 
In the real world of mediation, negotiation, arbitration and litigation, parties are 
behaving strategically to render the legislation intelligible, and to maximise 
particular interpretations of, and outcomes from, the statutory compensation 
processes. In negotiation and mediation contexts, they are often doing so with 
little recourse to strict definitions, formulae or market valuation mechanisms. To 
that extent, the legislation’s multiple pathways and lack of definitional clarity 
could be said to facilitate a degree of flexibility about native title compensation. 
While it might be analytically useful to demarcate ‘adverse effect compensation’ 
from other forms of rent-sharing, access fees, in-kind conditions and beneficial 
settlements that are being negotiated under the legislation, the multiplicity of 
statutory pathways and variety of negotiation practices make the validity of such 
a definitional distinction difficult to maintain. 
The compensation principles and criteria set out under the statutory framework 
differ significantly from those relevant under Aboriginal law-based regimes of 
compensation. How then, can the loss or extinguishment of the inalienable 
Aboriginal possession of land be valued or reinstated in the face of what has been 
called ‘bucket loads’ of extinguishment, the forced taking of native title, and 
unwilling ‘sellers’? The following sections draw together some of the issues 
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involved and explore possible options—from an anthropological perspective, and 
in light of the above accounts of the Aboriginal and statutory discourses about 
compensation. 
Creating a recognition space for native title compensation 
[I]t is worth remembering that almost every legal development is, by definition, just a 
little unthinkable (Gray 1994: 207). 
[I]ngrained habits of thought and understanding must be adjusted to reflect the 
diverse rights and interests which are under the rubric of ‘native title’ (Gummow J in 
Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53 at 29). 
A common feature of the statutory and Aboriginal discourses described above is 
that both are grappling with how compensation for native title might be 
appropriately conceptualised and valued. The proposition is advanced here that a 
more relevant holistic approach needs to be developed; and a new ‘recognition 
space’ created for native title compensation.  
It is generally agreed that determinations of native title compensation (whether 
those be arbitral or court-based) will be based on an assessment of the specific 
native title rights and interests of relevant native title claimants and holders; and 
on the specific effects of an ‘act’ on their native title. In order for native title to be 
recognised by the common law, the ‘facts’ of native title have to be determined 
through translation from one cultural domain (Aboriginal law and custom) to 
another (the Australian common law). It is important, therefore, to ascertain what 
appear to be the current limits of that common law translation.  
The translation problems involved are not new; there is a long experience of them 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 (ALRA). Many of the same 
difficulties are arising in the native title arena. Justices Deane and Gaudron 
accepted in Mabo (No 2) that it is correct to assume that ‘the traditional interests 
of the native inhabitants are to be respected even though those interests are of a 
kind unknown to English law’ (1992, 175 CLR 1 at 85). Justice Brennan went so 
far as to argue that ‘the general principle that the common law will recognise a 
customary title only if it be consistent with the common law is subject to an 
exception in favour of traditional native title’ (Mabo (no. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 59, 
emphasis added). The extent of that exception is uncertain and still being 
explored. 
As the High Court noted in Fejo v Northern Territory ((1998) 156 ALR 721 at 737), 
because native title is recognised by the common law, there is ‘an intersection of 
traditional laws and customs with the [Australian] common law’. Indigenous 
lawyer, Noel Pearson (1996: 5–6), has referred to native title as a ‘recognition 
concept’ created at this intersecting space between the two systems of law where 
there is recognition. Native title is then, the ‘recognition space’ between two laws. 
The preferable approach to determining the content of common law native title, 
according to the High Court, is ‘to recognise the inappropriateness of forcing the 
native title to conform to . . . common law concepts and to accept it as sui generis 
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or unique’ (Mabo no. 2 (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 89, per Deane and Gaudron JJ). And, 
as Justice Gummow’s comment in the Yanner decision, quoted above, suggests: 
‘ingrained habits of thought and understanding must be adjusted’. 
Accordingly: 
• the current nature, content and survival of native title must be ascertained 
as matters of fact, by reference to the laws and customs of the people of the 
relevant territory or locality; 
• native title will vary from one region to another and will need to be 
determined on a case by case basis; and  
• native title constituent title rights, interests and responsibilities may have  
no equivalent to incidents of legal estates and entitlements in land under 
Western law. 
Arguably, similar conclusions can be made in respect to native title 
compensation. It also is sui generis and unique—its principles and precedents 
may be unknown to, and have no analogous legal right or interest under, the 
common law. It may, therefore, similarly subject to an exception in its favour.  
Native title, having its origin and content ‘derived solely’ under Aboriginal law and 
custom, also includes Aboriginal principles, concepts, processes and values of 
compensation—and these compensatory regimes are fundamentally relevant to 
the rights and interests of native title holders in land and waters. Accordingly, 
there will be a similar intersection between Aboriginal laws and customs of 
compensation relevant to native title, and the Australian common law of 
compensation. There should also be a corresponding ‘recognition space’ within 
common law recognition, for the Aboriginal rights and interests of native title 
compensation.  
As with native title, native title compensation will require an innovative 
jurisprudential approach that acknowledges it to be a fundamentally new 
creature, belonging to the native title recognition space. It is, therefore, legally 
ethnocentric and reductionist to equate native title compensation rights and 
interests either to Western property law concepts and precedents, or to market 
land valuation methodology. 
A number of conclusions follow. First, the conventional principles of ‘special 
value’ to the owner, or ‘solatium’, will be of little if any direct applicability when 
trying to assess the ‘value’ to native title holders of their native title for the 
purposes of compensation. Second, freehold market value does not provide a 
notional limit for that culturally-based value nor for the losses of past, current 
and future generations. Third, there will be little relevance in using the area of 
land as a basis for measurement: a small area of waste land may have a ‘big’ site 
on it, or a Dreaming track passing through. Nor can the frequency of exercise of a 
right or responsibility be used as a measure: a major ceremony may only be 
conducted once a year or decade. Fifth, the analytical division posed by some 
writers (see Whipple 1997) between the so-called ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ 
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aspects of native title is spurious, and misrepresents the culturally-based facts of 
compensation under Aboriginal law. The spiritual, economic, social and corporeal 
domains of Aboriginal life are seen as indivisible, and posed upon a fundamental 
connection with land. Aboriginal principles and processes of compensation are 
built upon the same paradigm. 
Native title compensation is best viewed conceptually as a multi-dimensional 
package whose form and purpose reveal the distribution of social (and legal) 
relations and entitlements, and of value preferences. To pursue a strict definition 
of compensation ignores the variety of forms it is actually taking in practice, and 
importantly, ignores Aboriginal evaluations of what constitutes native title and 
appropriate compensation.  
The new recognition space for native title compensation will expand and contract 
as courts deliver their judgements and parties negotiate outcomes. At the heart of 
that space however, one principle should remain constant: that native title 
constitutes a proprietary right, and its extinguishment amounts to an acquisition 
of property (Deane and Gaudron JJ in Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 111; 107 
ALR at 84). Measuring the value of native title for the purposes of compensation, 
especially in the context of formal applications for the determination of 
compensation, will focus on what kind of property right it is and, in particular, 
what constitutes ‘property’, ‘loss’, ‘extinguishment’ and ‘just terms’. While there 
will continue to be contending evaluations of these concepts, in legal, economic 
and other forums across the world, a more ‘socially oriented vision of entitlement 
is starting to emerge’ (Gray 1994: 207). Such a trend is well suited to creating a 
recognition space for, and facilitating practical outcomes from, native title 
compensation. 
Of concern, however, is the extent to which the common law will be capable of 
stepping outside its own ethnocentrism, in order to recognise native title and 
native title compensation as it is conceived of and practiced under Aboriginal law 
and custom. The essential challenge to the common law, one raised by the High 
Court itself at different times, is that ‘ingrained habits of thought and 
understanding must be adjusted’—‘habits’ more critically characterised by Brest 
(1982: 765) as ‘the self-congratulatory and complacent reign of the legal process’.  
Common law recognition and valuation of native title for the purposes of 
compensation will require an expansion of ‘the borders of the legal imagination’ 
(Macklem 1991; see also Davis 2001; Grattan & McNamara 1999; Pask 1993) and 
a more critical jurisprudential reflection on the common law’s conceptual 
separation between its own legal ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. The ‘common’ aspect of the 
common law does not seem to readily admit other legal values and practices 
which currently comprise multicultural Australia. As Brest (1982: 770–3) has 
pointed out, given that the demographic of the legal ‘interpretative community’ 
reveals a group of mostly ‘white, male, professional, and relatively wealthy’ 
exponents, then the interpretative rules themselves and the authoritativeness of 
outcomes of the common law respond to that demographic. The ‘recognition 
space’ or ‘intersection’ existing between Aboriginal law and Western law could 
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thereby be constrained to a significant degree—‘much of our commitment to the 
rule of law really seems a commitment to the rule of our law’ (Brest 1982: 772; see 
also French 2000). 
But arguably, common law rules and Australia’s native title legislation do not, as 
French appears to propose ‘form the universe of discourse within which 
indigenous people … must operate’.14 Aboriginal land owners are not mute, 
without a discourse of their own about law, property, and the value of inalienable 
possessions. Hopefully, under the ‘common’ law development of native title that is 
now being carried out, Indigenous Australians can do more than simply bring 
their ‘special knowledge and insights’ to bear in native title compensation cases. 
Native title as cultural property 
The essential nature of property is to be found in social relations rather than in any 
inherent attributes of the thing or object that we call property. Property, in other 
words, is not a thing, but a network of social relations that governs the conduct of 
people with respect to the use and disposition of things (Hoebel 1966: 424). 
[W]hatever absolute criteria of property may be set up, the ultimate determinant of 
what is property and what is not is to be sought in the attitude of the group from 
whose culture a given instance of ownership is taken (Herskovits 1965: 326). 
[I]t is possible to speak of loss in relation to the notion of kinship and belonging 
rather than possession. I suggest that the relationship implied by cultural property 
rights may be a form of belonging as well as a kind of possession … the concept of 
cultural property rights can help to identify the referents of indigenous discourse 
about culture loss (Kirsch 2001: 169). 
In light of the complex dimensions of property highlighted in the above 
quotations, and given native title is a property right, there is unlikely to be any 
fast-track or single formula for the calculation of native title compensation. 
Indeed, echoing Herskovits’ sentiment, the Preamble to the legislation (Part 1, 
Preliminary, section 1: 2) states that: ‘Justice requires that, if acts that extinguish 
native title are to be validated or to be allowed, compensation on just terms, and 
with a special right to negotiate its form, must be provided to the holders of native 
title’ (emphasis added). 
New concepts of property and ownership are needed to deal with the Aboriginal 
realities of native title, and with the Aboriginal right to negotiate the form of 
compensation that might flow from extinguished, lost or impaired native title 
property entitlements. To gain a wider perspective of concepts of ‘property’ and 
‘ownership’, Kevin Gray (1994), Professor of Law at the University of Cambridge, 
imagined a virtual meeting with visiting Martians bent on researching the 
terrestrial concept of property in order to ‘look afresh’ at the ‘terrestrial concept of 
property’ (1994: 157). Gray need not have resorted to science fiction. He needed 
only to examine the Australian common law’s ongoing ‘encounter of the third 
kind’ with the alien notion of ‘native title’. The ongoing debate generated by that 
encounter highlights some critical issues relevant to considering what kind of 
property right native title is. 
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Over the last decade, Gray (see 1991, 1994; and also Gray & Gray 1998) has 
attempted a worthy expansion of the notion of property beyond that of the 
‘insistent allocation of private rights of ownership’, to that of ‘equitable property’—
where property is the name given to a legally (because socially) endorsed 
constellation of power over things and resources’ (1994: 160; emphasis added). It 
is ‘a socially approved power relationship in respect to socially valued assets’ 
(1994: 160). His formulations have been influential in High Court thinking (see 
McIntyre 2001), but as the quotations above suggest, they are not necessarily 
new outside the legal arena. 
As several commentators have noted, we tend to think automatically of property 
as the thing or resource which is owned (see Hann 1998; Herskovits 1965; Hoebel 
1996; Kirsch 2001; Radin 1982; Strathern 1996, 1999). The need to overcome the 
‘thingyness’ of property has seen researchers emphasise the importance of both 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ property; that is, its ‘innominate and anomalous interests’ as well 
as its objective referents (see Kirsch 2001; Weiner 1992; and Dixon J in Bank of 
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 349).  
As Hann (1998: 1–47) succinctly poses it, property is embedded; it is ‘actually a 
form of sociality’, a ‘distribution of social entitlements’. But furthermore, property 
is also a ‘way of knowing’; it comprises the systems of knowledge, ideas, practices, 
connections to place, and beliefs about particular areas of land, that legitimate 
rights of ownership, access and use of it (Anderson 1998: 69). Justice North in 
Western Australia v Ward ((2000) 170 ALR 159 at 354–6, referring to Gray & Gray 
1998: 27) adopts the analysis of Gray and Gray that the idea of ‘property’ 
oscillates between the behavioural, the conceptual and the obligational, between 
competing models of property as a fact, property as a right and property as a 
responsibility. In the Yanner decision ((1999) HCA 53 at 17), Justices Gleeson, 
Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne argue that ‘an important aspect of the socially 
constituted fact of native title rights and interests that is recognised by the 
common law is the spiritual, cultural and social connection with the land’. In 
their entirety, these core attributes of native title arguably constitute what Kirsch 
(2001) and others refer to as ‘cultural property’. This understanding of native title 
as a cultural property right challenges Anglo-Australian concepts which are 
constrained by a commodity logic that detaches persons and things (see also Rose 
1994: 296). 
The ethnographic literature, the record of native title claim documents, and 
negotiation and court proceedings make clear that, for Aboriginal Australians, 
native title as cultural property encompasses not only land and waters and its 
places, sites and resources, but also the songs, stories, knowledge, ritual and 
ceremonies, kinship systems, art, the law and the Dreaming that are connected to 
land and waters, and the distribution of social relations and entitlements vested 
in them. The responsibilities which flow from that distribution are encapsulated 
in Gray’s (1994: 163) idea of rights of property resulting in stewardship that is 
derived ‘from conscientious obligations to deal with an asset or resource in a 
certain way’. For Aboriginal groups, obligations and stewardship in respect to 
land are derived from Aboriginal law. Aboriginal ideas of native title as property 
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are best constituted as cultural property for personhood and for grouphood; an 
inalienable possession.  
The core characteristics of Aboriginal views of property—its inalienability, the 
stewardship involved, the interdependence of social, spiritual, economic and legal 
attachments, of its ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components—have direct implications for how 
native title should be valued for the purposes of compensation. In so far as 
‘equitable property is commensurate with equitable relief’, the beneficial 
entitlement of native title requires the need for ‘just terms’ in respect to both 
process and outcomes. The concept of native title as cultural property can be used 
to identify the Aboriginal referents of value and loss caused by the taking of 
inalienable possessions, and of what might constitute appropriate compensation 
processes and outcomes. 
Just terms compensation for native title as cultural property 
In respect to valuing native title as cultural property, compensation on ‘just 
terms’ seems to be the governing statutory issue.15 ‘Just terms’ compensation 
underpins the determination of quantum for acts of States as well as acts of the 
Commonwealth Government. This means that while States are not obliged to give 
compensation on just terms for impairment or extinguishment of other sorts of 
property, they are obliged under the legislation to give just terms compensation 
for any impairment of native title.  
The nature of the loss, impairment or extinguishment of native title will be the 
basis for determination of compensation. This means that the nature of native 
title as a cultural property right, and the common law’s capacity for recognition of 
that proposition, will be fundamental. The courts are still in the thick of the 
debate about whether the common law recognises the full extent of the 
relationship with the land as it is perceived to exist and be exercised by Aboriginal 
people themselves (called ‘spiritual connection’ by the majority of judges in the 
Ward decision and ‘organic title’ by Gleeson J in argument in that case in the 
High Court), or whether it will be read down as constituting only a ‘bundle of 
rights’.  
In attempting to broaden the common law consideration of native title, French 
(2000: 10) makes an important distinction when he points out that common law 
or legislative extinguishment is a legal metaphor for the ‘rule of limitation or 
qualification of the recognition’ of native title. In its legal form, he argues, 
extinguishment can be said to comprise a separate category, in distinction to that 
of the lived reality of Aboriginal people (where extinguishment of another category 
might separately occur as a matter of cultural fact). Of course, in the real world, 
legal extinguishment does not remain quarantined from having its own impact on 
Aboriginal groups. The longer history of land rights in the Northern Territory 
attests to the symbiotic relationship that developed between Aboriginal land 
ownership and the workings of the ALRA (see examples by Smith and other 
authors in Hiatt 1984). In other words, non-recognition by the common law, or 
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legal extinguishment, may have the more pernicious effect of facilitating actual 
extinguishment or impairment of the cultural, spiritual and social aspects of 
native title as a lived experience. When legal and/or cultural extinguishment 
occur—when inalienable cultural property is treated as detached alienable 
property—the quantum of compensation sought by native title holders is likely to 
be extremely high (perhaps onerously high for governments), and the 
interpretation of ‘just terms’ will be a critical factor. 
If native title is recognised by the courts in a restricted sense of bundles of rights 
that can be desegregated, it may be that native title will be easy to extinguish 
legally. If native title is recognised by the common law in its fullness—as an 
inalienable cultural property right for personhood and grouphood—it may not be 
easy to extinguish legally. In that event, most compensation may well be for 
impairment and diminution, rather than loss and extinguishment. Then, the 
quantum sought is likely to be based on the value of restricted Aboriginal access 
and use rights for particular periods, after which native title rights and interests 
might resume or be restituted (as currently seems to be the case for mining 
tenements where the non-extinguishment principle applies, at least in the 
legislation). In these circumstances, ‘just terms’ may refer not so much to the 
quantum sought, as to what might comprise the means whereby rights and 
interests are able to be later re-asserted. 
The High Court has stated that ‘just terms’ be given a liberal construction and 
that it requires meeting a standard of justice amounting to ‘fair dealing’ (see 
Nelungaloo v Commonwealth (1952) 85 CLR 545 at 6000, per Kitto J). This 
suggests that ‘just terms’ should apply to the process of determining or 
negotiating compensation, not simply to the end product.  
‘Just terms’ compensation will require a full consideration of the sui generis 
nature of native title, and such related intangibles as cultural loss and the 
inherent inalienability of native title under Indigenous law and custom. The NNTT 
in arbitration has rejected the idea that ‘the rights and interests of native title 
holders are artificially converted to freehold rights and that the peculiar features 
of native title are to be ignored’ (Re Koara People 1 (1996) 1312 FLR 73 at 88, per 
Seaman, Smith & Macdonald; also Western Australia v Thomas (1996) 133 FLR 
124 at 189, per Sumner, Neate & O’Neil). The NNTT has argued that the word 
‘enjoyment’, referred to under s. 39 arbitral criteria, implies making an 
assessment of the effect of an act on present usage and future amenity (WMC 
Resources, State of WA, Evans (Koara People) WF99/4; Sumner 2000: 85). Neate 
(1999: 80) has argued that the compensation payable under s. 51A of the 
legislation is not generally limited to market value, but extends to compensation 
for severance, injurious affection, disturbance, special value and solatium or 
other non-economic loss.  
Compensation will fail in such terms if it is based on a reductionist equivalence to 
freehold title or market value. ‘Just terms’ will also require regard to be had to the 
sui generis nature of Aboriginal compensatory regimes and the related rights, 
interests and stewardship operating under their own law and customs. The 
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measure and form of ‘just terms compensation’ will need to be based on 
ascertaining the concepts, value and wishes of native title holders. They are likely 
to hold a different interpretation of the purpose of compensation, and what will 
constitute appropriate recompense, mitigation or restitution. Some forms will be 
more, or less, appropriate. For example, the right ‘to negotiate the form’ of 
compensation may, from a native title group’s perspective, operate according to a 
scale of diminishing returns where, at one end of the spectrum of effects, 
extinguishment is regarded as being beyond monetary compensation. The earlier 
discussion of competing evaluations evident between Aboriginal modes of 
discourse about compensation and those of Western legal discourses, indicates 
there may be a fundamental incommensurability between what is taken away 
when native title is extinguished, and what might be given back in the form of 
compensation. For mutual equivalence to be secured, it will be the Aboriginal 
value of native title as a cultural property right—of which they may have been 
legally deprived—which must be made good by compensation. 
At first glance there appears to be a statutory preference for compensation to be 
in monetary form. Given the Aboriginal value attached to land as an inalienable 
possession, its equivalence to a monetary form must represent a reading down of 
those values. However, there are statutory procedures whereby cash can be 
converted to other forms of compensation, and native title groups are clearly 
looking for packages of compensation that combine monetary and non-monetary 
forms. In a recent case, native title claimants to a right to negotiate agreement 
over the Eastern Gas Pipeline in New South Wales sought and obtained an 
interlocutory injunction against the company involved for breach of agreement 
conditions for monitoring land disturbance and site protection (Phillips 2000). 
The claimants successfully argued in court, and Justice Young stated, that it was 
clear that financial compensation for the lost opportunity to exercise the 
culturally important traditional role of site monitoring and protection would not 
be an adequate remedy.  
The issue of the adequacy and form of compensation is not new, or specific to the 
native title arena. During the inquiry which led to the enactment of the ALRA in 
the Northern Territory, Justice Woodward (1974: 10) argued that ‘cash 
compensation in the pockets of this generation of Aborigines is no answer to the 
legitimate land claims of a people with a distinct past who want to maintain their 
separate identity in the future’. He believed that ‘the only appropriate direct 
recompense for those who have lost their traditional lands is other land—together 
with finance to enable that land to be used appropriately’ (1974: 10).  
‘Just terms’ suggests that it is proper that a court determination of compensation 
should, minimally, address the native title group’s future means for maintaining a 
cultural identity in the face of statutory extinguishment. Such an approach 
abides by the fundamental principle of awarding damages: namely 
reinstatement—restoring plaintiffs to the position they would have been in had 
the negligent injury not occurred. That would require value to be assessed on a 
‘full compensation’ basis, taking the form of a general damages award. Such an  
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award would have to be based on considering the intrinsic value of native title as 
cultural property and its value to Aboriginal owners for their own special 
purposes (see also Garnett 1998; Gobbo 1993; Lavarche & Riding 1998; Neate 
1999; Orr 1997).  
Just terms compensation for extinguishment might mean, as arguments by 
Woodward and Gray imply, that reinstatement in circumstances of 
extinguishment over an area of native title land could only effectively be achieved 
by providing native title holders with inalienable freehold over other areas of land 
for which the group also asserts native title (and where legal extinguishment has 
not occurred). That may well require ‘confirming the right of the indigenous 
peoples of Australia to reconstruct their traditional relationship with their 
country’ (Gray 1994: 186–7).  
For the purpose of considering what might constitute aspects of cultural property 
for the purposes of native title compensation for extinguishment, a culturally-
informed ‘Heads of Damages’ is outlined below. This lists key domains of potential 
cultural loss for which logically probative facts would need to be considered. 
A Heads of Damages for native title compensation  
The general rule in the law of torts (civil injury) is that a person will be 
compensated for all losses suffered as a result of the action which has been 
committed against them. Torts law has ‘Heads of Damages’ (Heads) which are the 
broad categories of types of losses for which the claimant may seek 
compensation. The Heads are intended to reflect the losses which society 
recognises as resulting from a tort. This paper argues that a new Heads needs to 
be developed for native title rights and interests (see also Garnett 1998; Neate 
1999). These Heads would be based on native title as a cultural property right, 
and the categories of loss would be wider than the framework currently afforded 
by a torts claim for loss. A native title Heads will need to reflect individual and 
collective losses, inter-generational loss, and the loss of inalienable possession of 
cultural property in both its ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ dimensions. If native title 
compensation is sui generis then ‘just terms’ as both equitable process and 
outcomes for the extinguishment of native title will need to be informed by the 
content and value of the title to its dispossessed owners. Some guidance as to the 
content of a Heads can be taken from the Aboriginal compensation principles and 
criteria which have been described above. It is not surprising that these are 
routinely invoked by native title claimants in the course of mediation and 
negotiations about their native title. 
A Heads for compensation would encompass the effects of an act on the native 
title holders’ capacity and responsibility for, interests in, and rights to maintain 
and reproduce the following: 
• inalienable affiliation to land and waters; 
• possession, use, access, enjoyment and protection of those land and waters; 
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• sociality and social relatedness (including corporate identity, family life and 
parenting, marriage, kin systems, birthing and mortuary practices, social 
capital); 
• systems of traditional governance, authority and decision-making; 
• a religious life (including life cycle initiation stages, a corpus of religious 
beliefs and practices, personal and group relationships with the spirit world 
and creators, etc); 
• an individual and group cultural identity and way of life (including language, 
socialisation, traditions, intellectual and artistic capital); 
• economic structures and way of life (including exchange, distribution and 
sharing, means of production, barter); 
• physical and psychological health and wellbeing; and 
• future succession and generational native title rights, interests and 
responsibilities in land and waters. 
It is worth noting that there is a certain congruence with a number of these 
proposed Heads criteria and the broad s. 39 criteria set out under the legislation 
for making arbitral body determinations. These include the effect of future acts on 
native title holders’ enjoyment of their registered native title rights and interests; 
on the way of life, culture and traditions of any of those parties; the development 
of their social, cultural and economic structures; freedom of access to the land or 
waters concerned; and freedom to carry out rites, ceremonies or other activities of 
cultural significance. 
The lessons and challenges for compensation policy 
and practice 
For Aboriginal people, there is a fundamental qualification to their engagement in 
seeking compensation. It is being played out in the context of the statutory 
extinguishment and forced taking of native title by government. They are not 
willing sellers, and the compensation they may be seeking is based on effects over 
which they have no right of veto. Aboriginal objectives in participating in the 
negotiation or court determination of native title compensation will be coloured by 
their own criteria, preferences, and measures of outcome.  
For the parties involved in negotiation and mediation, as opposed to court 
litigation, the consideration of native title compensation is becoming the vehicle 
for developing other kinds of social and economic relationships. In the process, 
contending values and objectives have to be settled to mutual satisfaction. To  
do so, a number of practical challenges are arising, and some old policy lessons 
are re-emerging.  
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The problem with static compensation 
A challenging issue for all parties is the sustainability of compensation 
agreements over time. It has become apparent, over the 25-year period the ALRA 
has been in operation in the Northern Territory, that the impacts of resource 
development do not all occur at the same time. Impacts can be ongoing, may 
occur in stages, or build up componentially, or be short-lived. Different types of 
impact may affect different generations of native title parties. This perspective of 
impact as an evolving state is entirely in accordance with Aboriginal views. 
Arguably, compensation terms and conditions should address equity within the 
native title party over time. 
Gray (1994: 189–90) points to the Weiss (1989) argument for ‘intergenerational 
equity’ whereby each generation is burdened by an obligation of trusteeship to 
conserve the quality and diversity of the natural and cultural resource base for 
future generations. The same notion of guardianship or stewardship for future 
generations is found in the Aboriginal concept of ‘looking after’ the land. Justice 
von Soussa (in Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) no. DG3 at 529) 
characterised this relationship legally as a ‘fiduciary duty’ because of the ‘trust 
and confidence’ to preserve knowledge by guarding it against infringement.  
If compensation under the legislation is, first and foremost, for an effect on native 
title, and given native title is a property right transmitted across time to 
succeeding generations, then compensation for ongoing effects must, in fairness, 
also be available to those future generations for future effect. If the 
extinguishment of native title constitutes cultural loss of ‘property for grouphood’, 
that argument is all the more persuasive when, as Moustakas (1989) points out, 
future generations are unable to consent to transactions that threaten their 
existence as a group. For that reason, compensation should include a loading for 
inter-generational equity. 
The alternative to a current loading is that compensation could be staggered by 
developing conjunctive conditions for its assessment over the life of an act. 
Staggering the negotiation of compensation might not satisfy the needs of any 
party for current certainty about the exact total of compensation, especially when 
that amount could effectively constitute a final cap on compensation. On the 
other hand, such an approach would have the advantage that the total amount of 
compensation could be more directly linked to actual impacts (positive or 
negative); be informed by ongoing impact assessment; and be distributed to the 
persons actually experiencing impacts over the life of an act. It might also ensure 
that native title parties would have benefits remaining, to enable them to deal 
with the later ‘closure’ of a resource development project, and the need to re-
establish access to, and use of, the land involved (Altman & Smith 1994).  
Distributive equity and spread 
Several writers have noted that perhaps one of the greatest impacts of resource 
development has come from the provision of compensation itself (Altman 1983; 
Altman & Smith 1994; Smith & Finlayson 1997; Turnbull 1980). Howitt’s (1991: 
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133) conclusion that the distribution and application of income from mining on 
Walpiri country in the late 1980s ‘has the greatest direct impact on [their] social 
relations’ and ‘creates considerable social disruption . . . [and] constant discus-
sion and disputation’, is also being documented by other researchers in the native 
title arena.  
A major weakness in the native title statutory framework is that there are no 
guiding principles to direct consideration of the twin issues of distributive equity 
and distributive spread. Distributive equity focuses on the issue of how to ensure 
that compensation benefits are directed towards the ‘right’ native title party and 
equitably to all the members of that party—within the group and over time. 
Distributive spread refers to the issue of whether equity entails a more inclusive 
list of beneficiaries than just the native title claimants or holders. For example, 
should the wider Indigenous community within which native title claimants 
reside, or others who might be affected by the doing of an act, be included as 
beneficiaries of compensation? In the native title arena, these matters have been 
the cause of considerable conflict. 
Under the logic of inclusiveness that has been described as informing Aboriginal 
thinking about the social boundaries of compensation, the effect of an act upon 
native title will invariably be seen to include more people than the native title 
holders. As noted earlier, not all Aboriginal relations, things and people are 
conceived of as being equal. Just as Aboriginal interpretations of the cause and 
effect of actions are based upon identifying the radiating social fields, so the way 
compensation is subsequently distributed will be subject to the same pressure to 
identify concentric rings of ‘affectedness’ and to privilege certain categories of 
relations (pers. Comm. P. Sutton; see also Altman 1997; Altman & Smith 1994; 
Smith 1984).16  
Differing degrees of rights and interests in land, which Sutton (1998b) has 
characterised as ‘core’ and contingent’, are often reflected in distribution 
arrangements. In that sense, ‘unequal’ distributive spread could be seen as a 
legitimate reflection of the internal ordering and distribution of Aboriginal land 
entitlements. But it might also simply be the result of inadequate, fast-track 
consultation. For example, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of negotiation 
processes with native title groups about compensation can create privileged 
interests and rights. These are influential when later identifying the beneficiaries 
of any compensation. People excluded or overlooked in the initial phase may have 
their subsequent native title compensation rights and interests disadvantaged. 
Others have their position legitimised and, in some cases, enhanced over others.  
There are discernible trends and lessons that should be heeded from the earliest 
days of implementing compensation arrangements under the ALRA, regarding 
how the social boundaries of impact and beneficiary groups are defined for the 
purposes of distributing compensation (see Altman 1983, 1985; Altman & Smith 
1994; Smith 1984: 94–100; articles in Smith & Finlayson 1997). One important 
lesson is that distribution equity and spread should be addressed before  
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compensation agreements are signed off, not after. Another is that the wide 
distribution of monies to ‘affected people’ in the Northern Territory has led to in-
migration by Aboriginal people to ‘high’ royalty and compensation areas. As a 
result, compensation monies have become thinly spread and less effective, and 
conflict has been exacerbated by contested rights to membership in beneficiary 
groups. Excessive distributive spread and subsequently large membership lists of 
royalty associations in the Northern Territory, has led membership becoming 
more tightly defined once agreements are actually implemented. In one notable 
case, over a period of some 15 years, membership in a royalty association was 
reduced from over 1,200 to 80 beneficiaries (Altman & Smith 1994). This belated 
exclusiveness in distributing compensation has generated conflict, especially  
as compensation monies run out and services are cut. Over time these tensions 
have caused seemingly successful agreements to become unworkable, and led to 
poor outcomes from compensation. Similar issues are occurring in many native 
title negotiations.  
There are grounds for considering whether there are better means of managing 
and distributing compensation payments. It is in the interest of all parties that 
compensation packages developed under any statutory pathway should clearly 
identify the full set of beneficiaries; the extent to which benefits are to be more or 
less widely distributed; the principles upon which distribution decisions have 
been (and are to be) made; and the mechanisms to resolve any dispute about 
distribution. Given that Aboriginal law-based regimes for compensation are 
fundamentally based on an ongoing process of negotiating the social boundaries 
of the fields of instigation and effect, it is not surprising that this way of operating 
permeates every negotiation about the distribution of native title compensation. 
There are equally good grounds for suggesting that a certain proportion of all 
native title compensation should not be secured until native title is determined 
(as occurs under the arbitration phase, or with a formal application for 
compensation). That proportion could remain undistributed and be invested for 
use by later generations of beneficiaries. Similarly, the many one-off payments of 
negotiated compensation may be more effective if pooled into a single regional or 
community fund, administered by a regional representative agent (for example, a 
native title representative body, a prescribed body corporate or a newly 
established regional native title compensation association). There is a well-
documented case for recommending that the immediate distribution of cash 
compensation does little, in the end, to address the effects of a future act upon 
native title, especially if land is not included in the package. 
The issue of substitution compensation 
The native title legislation facilitates a degree of flexibility in the negotiation of 
compensation, and native title claimants behave strategically to secure 
compensation in a form relevant to their needs. But there is also the potential 
problem of what might be called ‘substitution compensation’ (see also Altman 
1997; Altman & Pollack 1998). 
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Substitution compensation is a complex matter and again raises the fact that 
there are competing evaluations as to what comprises appropriate compensation. 
It arises where compensation includes the substitution of cash with goods and 
services that should—according to Commonwealth Grants Commission funding 
considerations—be generally accessible to all citizens. One perspective of this 
issue is that native title claimants or holders who accept compensation in the 
form of housing, infrastructure, health services, municipal services such as water 
or power, and so on, are accepting substitutes which should already be provided 
on an equitable basis by government as part of its delivery of essential services to 
all citizens. They are thereby receiving less compensation than they otherwise 
might. From this perspective, it is not at all clear that substitute commodities and 
services should actually be called ‘native title compensation’.  
The fact is, however, that the legislation encourages substitution by establishing 
a broad equivalence between monetary payment, and other ‘goods and services’ to 
which cash can be transformed (ss. 79(1) and (2)). This substitution may not 
immediately be problematic for native title groups. As noted, the expectations and 
objectives which native title groups bring to bear on negotiations mean they may 
prefer the provisions of such goods and services. The difficulty with justifying 
such substitution is that native title groups often participate in negotiations from 
a position of marked economic disadvantage. Substitute goods may appear to 
assist in overcoming such disadvantage. Unfortunately, this outcome is unlikely: 
substitution compensation is invariably not based on an agreed recurrent 
provision of services, but is a ‘one-off’, or lasts only the life of the agreement. Case 
study evidence from the operation of royalty associations in the Northern 
Territory also suggests that a piecemeal approach to providing remedial 
government-style services has in fact not overcome the underlying economic 
disadvantage of traditional owners (Altman 1996; Altman & Smith 1994). The 
more astute, long-term investment and pooling of cash does seem to be 
generating a more sustainable pool of resources for use by current and future 
native title generations. 
When securing goods and service as a component of compensation, native title 
groups will have to weigh up the balance between substitution issues, their 
economic and social goals, and the effect on their capacity to transmit cultural 
property. Preferably, substitution compensation should play a minimal role.  
The need for transparency and benchmarks 
There are currently no statutory criteria or benchmarks for evaluating the terms 
and conditions of compensation agreements or determinations, or for monitoring 
compliance with them. Negotiated agreements such as ILUAs, future act 
agreements, and mediated consent agreements in respect to applications for 
native title or compensation, are required to be lodged either with the Federal 
Court or various registers operated by the NNTT. But these statutory 
requirements are minimal. In respect to NNTT procedures, parties invariably only 
register the signed cover page and not the underlying deed of agreement.  
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Where full agreements details are produced as exhibits to the court for the 
purposes of a determination of compensation or native title, the deed documents 
are returned to parties and so are not publicly available. The result is that 
perhaps the most accessible debate about the whole issue of compensation, along 
with information about various terms and conditions, are to be found in NNTT 
arbitration transcripts and final arbitral determinations (see Sumner 2000).  
Nor are the detailed terms and conditions of side agreements negotiated under 
the Act publicly available. Apart from anecdotal reports, it is not even possible to 
tell which agreements might include compensation as a condition, let alone to 
evaluate the form or outcomes.  
At the heart of any call for greater transparency in compensation agreements lie 
alternative interpretations of whether the compensation is private (hence there is 
no requirement to be open) or public (hence there is a public interest in greater 
scrutiny) (similar arguments have been considered under the ALRA by Altman 
1985, 1998; Levitus 1999). Whatever the outcome of that debate, the lack of 
transparency contributes to inadequate monitoring of compensation payments, 
obstructs independent evaluation of terms and conditions, and limits the 
development of benchmarks for how compensation might be better measured, 
distributed and managed. 
There is considerable public and policy attention paid to the accountability of 
native title parties for their receipt of compensation. By contrast, there seems to 
be little attention given to monitoring the compliance and accountability of other 
parties (including governments) with the terms of compensation agreements or 
determinations. If compensation is supposed to bring about an improvement in 
the social, economic and cultural circumstances of native title groups, then one 
can only conclude that it is currently impossible to ascertain whether positive 
outcomes are being achieved. Assertions of ‘commercial-in-confidence’ 
sensitivities are a poor justification for the resulting lack of scrutiny. 
A more systematic and transparent approach to these issues is required. One 
option could include giving native title representative bodies a statutory role to: 
• evaluate the terms and conditions of any compensation payments; 
• monitor the implementation of all negotiated agreements including 
compensation;  
• provide independent financial advice to native title groups about 
compensation; and 
• publicly report on these activities.  
Such bodies might be able to facilitate a more coordinated regional approach to 
the negotiation of compensation, establish mechanisms for pooling small one-off 
payments at a regional or community level, and develop regional benchmarks for 
appropriate forms and measures of ‘just terms’.  
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Taxing compensation 
Another emerging and complex policy issue is that of the potential taxability of 
native title compensation. Once again, it is not a new issue under the ALRA and 
in other State land rights arena, and it highlights the competing evaluations of 
the parties involved. In the process of amending the legislation in 1998, the 
Commonwealth Government announced it would contribute 75 per cent of the 
compensation costs of State and Territory Governments that might arise out of 
future act and intermediate period acts (see Commonwealth of Australia 1997: 
10). 
There has been little public scrutiny to date as to how this arrangement has been 
carried out, or what its impact has been on native title mediation and 
negotiations. If native title groups increasingly turn to seek compensation for 
extinguishment and loss, and if just terms compensation requires full damages or 
reinstatement, then government may find itself facing an expanding compen-
sation bill. One lesson to be learnt from countries such as Canada is that 
litigation usually costs more than negotiation and, better still, that active 
protection of the cultural property rights of Indigenous people limits the need for 
compensation remedies. 
A recent Federal Government initiative is the proposal to impose new taxation 
arrangements in respect to native title compensation. Specifically, this would 
involve payments made by non-native title parties by way of compensation for the 
temporary impairment or suspensions of native title becoming tax deductible, in 
the hands of the person making the payment, over the period of the impairment. 
Government further proposes implementing a withholding tax (in the order of 4%) 
on all payments received by native title parties by way of compensation. The 
terms for such a tax are currently being drafted by the Australian Taxation Office.  
The multiple statutory pathways for securing native title compensation, and the 
myriad forms it is taking, will create significant problems for the purposes of 
taxation. For example, it is unclear how a tax on non-monetary forms of 
compensation could be measured or collected, especially given the lack of detailed 
information about the content of most native title agreements. Furthermore, it is 
debatable whether a tax should be imposed on substitute goods and services that 
otherwise would be provided by governments as part of their standard essential 
services. It is also arguable that compensation income subsequently used by 
native title parties to cover their own later negotiation of other native title matters 
should be tax deductible in their hands, as is proposed for resource developers.  
It might appear ironic at best to native title holders that they will be taxed for the 
extinguishment or impairment of an inalienable cultural property right that is 
fundamental to their individual and group identity. At a more mundane economic 
level, it is likely that any eventual implementation of a native title tax will act  
to increase transaction costs. Native title claimants and holders will simply 
attempt to transfer the tax as an additional ‘top-up’ to the total negotiated 
compensation package.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has described, on the basis of an ethnographic review and long-term 
field research, the broad parameters of an Aboriginal discourse about 
compensation derived under Aboriginal law and custom. It has also examined the 
different statutory pathways for compensation under the Native Title Act 1993, 
and highlighted the contending evaluations and principles in operation between 
these two modes of discourse, and their implications for securing just and 
practical outcomes. There will continue to be inherent tensions and significant 
differences between how Aboriginal and other parties view the matter of 
compensation, in respect to its causes, resolution and outcomes. Some options 
have been proposed for dealing with the challenges that are arising. 
The negotiation of native title compensation is becoming the vehicle for developing 
other kinds of social and economic relationships, just as has occurred under 
other statutory jurisdictions. Native title negotiations do not occur in a vacuum; 
the realities of community life intrude, Aboriginal priorities and value systems are 
highly influential, as are their perceptions of the continuing historical fact of 
dispossession and ongoing socioeconomic disadvantage.  
When we try to understand exactly what it is that parties want out of 
compensation, we must accept that the process has psychological, cultural, 
symbolic and political dimensions which have a profound effect on the process 
and outcomes. These dimensions cannot easily be ignored, or excluded from the 
negotiation and implementation of agreements.  
In accordance with their own social preferences and conceptualisations of 
cultural property, the process of negotiating compensation may itself be part of 
compensation for many native title groups. The period of negotiation may be the 
first time their rights and concerns about country and culture are given a voice at 
the table. They will routinely invoke a range of principles and criteria derived from 
their own extant compensatory regimes, and attempt to insert culturally-based 
values into court and negotiation proceedings. The facts relevant to current 
considerations of compensation are argued by native title parties to legitimately 
include the burden of history and their hopes. In every statutory pathway, native 
title parties will invariably link process and outcomes together, and have great 
expectations of both. In accordance with a widespread culturally-based logic, 
many native title parties will start from an inclusive position as to what should be 
considered, and see the process of negotiation and court action as forming part of 
the process of restitution, recompense, recognition and beneficial settlement.  
Current negotiation and mediation practice suggests some parties are trying to 
adopt a workable approach to compensation. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the common law recognition of native title will be able to create a 
recognition space for compensation that addresses the intrinsic value of land to 
dispossessed Aboriginal owners. This paper suggests that to secure just terms 
and sustainable outcomes, all parties need to be made more aware of the 
implications attached to following different statutory pathways for compensation. 
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Other parties also need to be better informed about the nature of culturally-based 
values and logic that are routinely being bought to bear on negotiations and in 
the courts by native title groups. A new ‘compensation recognition space’ is 
needed which recognises both native title as a form of cultural property, and 
native title compensation as sui generis. With that combination, it may be 
possible to translate Indigenous compensatory principles and practices, in all 
their contemporary diversity, into just and sustainable agreements. 
 
Notes 
1. The reference to ‘Aboriginal’ rather than ‘Indigenous’ is intentional as the paper 
focuses on the ethnographic literature relevant to Aboriginal groups and their 
compensation processes. Conclusions presented here should not be taken as being 
applicable to Torres Strait Islander peoples who may exhibit distinctive cultural 
differences. 
2. In most cases where ‘land’ is used in this paper it can be taken as an abbreviation 
for ‘land and sea’. For coastal-dwelling people the one is the continuation of the 
other. 
3.  Gray (1994: 204) further acknowledges that: ‘This gathering [legal] perception of 
stewardship emulates something of the greater humility expressed in the Australian 
Aboriginals’ orientation towards land resources’. 
4. I would like to thank Peter Sutton for suggesting the significance of contemporary 
Indigenous competition over compensation as a mechanism which reveals that 
which is ‘most lost’, and hence most fought over in the native title arena. 
5. For example, when orders are made by the Federal Court that compensation is 
payable (s. 94), and when referring to requests that compensation be in a form other 
than monetary payments. 
6.  For example, under an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA). 
7.  For example, statutory traditional owners determined as such under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (NT) Act 1976 (ALRA) and whose statutory rights and interests over land 
and waters replace, or have converted, native title rights and interest, have their 
statutory rights and interests under the ALRA ‘covered by the expression native title 
and native title rights and interests’ (s. 223(3)). They are regarded as native title 
holders and therefore may act as such for the purposes of making a claim for 
compensation under the Native Title Act 1993, or for the purposes of entering into an 
ILUA. This ‘coverage’ also applies to State-based land rights legislation. 
8.  Whether that be for past acts (s. 18), intermediate period acts (s. 22E), future acts  
(s. 53(1)(a), or the application of any provisions of the Act in any particular case  
(s. 53(1)(b)). 
9.  A fact that has been described by Bartlett (2000: 443) as ‘dispossession without 
compensation’. 
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10. In that agreed determination, compensation for the extinguishment of native title 
over land proposed for a subdivision was agreed to as an amount equivalent to 150 
per cent of freehold; with the 50 per cent being for ‘special attachment’ (Lavarche & 
Riding 1998). The agreement provided for what was referred to as an ‘up-front’ 
payment of $256,000 in compensation for extinguishment, and $482,000 up-front 
for compulsory acquisition; a total of $738,000 for extinguishment over a total of 5 
hectares of land (Blackshield 1997). 
11. Federal Court offices in some States are currently reconsidering this approach in 
favour of retaining a copy of the Deed of Agreement.  
12. For more detail on the right to negotiate and its compensation mechanisms see 
Edmunds & Smith (2000); Litchfield (1999); Sumner (2000). 
13. For more detail on the three types of ILUAs and their relevant criteria see Lane 
(2001); Smith (1998). 
14. In one sense, this comment appears at odds with French’s ongoing attempt to 
broaden the common law consideration of native title, and expand the conceptual 
parameters of what constitutes extinguishment.  
15  There are several legal discussions of what ‘just terms’ might constitute (see e.g. 
Bartlett 2000; Neate 1999). 
16. This characterisation of core and peripheral impacts has been partly recognised 
under the ALRA where people in an ‘area affected’ by an act can be included as 
beneficiaries, alongside the ‘traditional owners’, of any compensatory payments 
secured under resource development agreements. 
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